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APPROACH TO STANDING THAN TO
JUSTICE SCALIA'S
Bradford C. Mank*
ABSTRACT
In American Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit
questioned three different grounds articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court for the constitutional doctrine of standing in
federal courts and instead argued that the "solidest grounds" for
the doctrine of standing are "practical." In part because of his
self-described "pragmatic" approach to legal reasoning, Judge
Posner's maverick views may have led Republican presidents to
pass him over for being nominated to the Supreme Court in favor
of less brilliant but more predictable conservative judges. Judge
Posner's pragmatic or practical approach to standing is closer to
Justice Breyer's "realistic threat" standing test than to the
conservative and constitutionally grounded standing
jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, although Justice Breyer's
pragmatism is more precedent-oriented than Judge Posner's.
Ultimately, Justice Breyer's efforts to liberalize existing Article
III standing doctrine may prove more fruitful than Judge
Posner's approach of abolishing constitutional standing and
replacing it with his proposed alternative "practical" standing
test.
* James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law,
P.O. Box 210040, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0040, Telephone 513-
556-0094, Fax 513-556-1236, e-mail: brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank Michael Solimine for his
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I. INTRODUCTION'
In American Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit questioned three different grounds
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court for the constitutional
doctrine of standing in federal courts and instead argued that the
"solidest grounds" for the doctrine of standing are "practical."
Judge Posner's views on standing may carry more weight than
most other federal courts of appeals judges because he is the
prolific and influential author of at least 30 books and more than
300 articles and book reviews.' He is both a highly respected
judge and legal scholar.4 He had taught as a Professor of Law at
1. This Article is one of a series of explorations of possible extensions of
modern standing doctrines. The other pieces are: (1) Bradford Mank, Should States
Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New
Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1701 (2008) [hereinafter Mank,
States Standingl; (2) Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does
Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Mank, Standing and Future Generations]; (3) Bradford
Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36
ECOLOGY L.Q. 665 (2009) (hereinafter Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons];
(4) Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic
Standing, but a "Realistic Threat" of Harm Is a Better Standing Test, 40 ENVTL. L. 89
(2010) [hereinafter Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic
Standing]; (5) Bradford Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den: Summers v. Earth Island
Institute's Misuse of Lyons's "Realistic Threat" of Harm Standing Test, 42 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 837 (2010); (6) Bradford C. Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute: Its
Implications for Future Standing Decisions, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10958 (2010);
(7) Bradford Mank, Standing in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: Using
Economic Injury as a Basis for Standing When Environmental Harm is Difficult to
Prove, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 307 (2010); and (8) Bradford C. Mank, Informational
Standing After Summers, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2012).
2. Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 650 F.3d 652, 654-56
(7th Cir. 2011).
3. Judge Richard A. Posner: Brief Biographical Sketch,
http://home.uchicago.edu/-rposner/biography (last visited Sept. 8, 2012).
4. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the
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the University of Chicago Law School until his appointment to
the Seventh Circuit in 1981' by President Reagan, a Republican,
who sought to appoint conservative judges to the federal courts.!
Professor Posner's early work on law and economics was
perceived as generally supportive of a "conservative" market
approach to legal decisionmaking, although the work of any
scholar as prolific as Posner is impossible to characterize by a
single phrase or position. For those who question whether a
judge's work can be accurately characterized as conservative or
liberal, Judge Posner himself has co-authored a leading article
that sought to rank U.S. Supreme Court justices serving between
1937 and 2006 on a conservative to liberal scale.' In part because
of his self-described "pragmatic" approach to legal reasoning,'
Judge Posner has not consistently adhered to a "conservative"
approach to issues, at least as defined by leading Republican
politicians, and his sometimes maverick views may have led
Republican presidents to pass him over for being nominated to
the Supreme Court in favor of less brilliant but more predictable
conservative judges."o It is also possible that Judge Posner is now
Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 19, 19-21 (2005) ("If obscurity defines the careers
of most judges, notoriety defines that of Judge Richard A. Posner... ."); Matthew A.
Edwards, Posner's Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH. L. REV. 299, 307-09
(2002); Martin H. Redish, The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and the Importance of
Analyzing Legal Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1378, 1378 (1985) (reviewing RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985)) ("[It is difficult to dispute
Posner's impact on the world of legal scholarship. In fact, through his pathbreaking and
highly controversial examination of legal problems in terms of economic analysis, Posner
may now rival [Roscoe] Pound and [Karl] Llewellyn as the academic of the twentieth
century who has most influenced the shape of legal thought." (footnote omitted)); Fred R.
Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 tbl.6 (2000) (listing
Posner as the most cited legal authority in American history, eclipsing third-place Oliver
Wendell Holmes by 50 percent).
5. Judge Richard A Posner: Brief Biographical Sketch, supra note 3.
6. President Reagan, who served in office from 1981 until 1989, stated that his
goal was to appoint a federal judiciary "made up of judges who believe in law and order
and a strict interpretation of the Constitution." David M. O'Brien, The Reagan Judges:
His Most Enduring Legacy?, in THE REAGAN LEGACY, 60, 60-62 (Charles 0. Jones, ed.
1988).
7. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1972).
See also Roger Parloff, The Negotiator: No One Doubts that Richard Posner Is a Brilliant
Judge and Antitrust Theoretician. Is that Enough to Bring Microsoft and the Government
Together?, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2000, at 120, 122, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2000/01/10/271747/index.htm
(describing Posner as a conservative advocate of the Chicago Schools market approach to
law and economics).
8. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A
Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 781-83 & tbl. 3 (2009) (ranking the most
conservative to least conservative justices).
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. Robert Boynton, Sounding Off, WASH. POST BOOK WORLD, Jan. 20, 2002,
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more willing to take bold positions, such as abolishing Article III
standing, because he knows that it is unlikely that he will be
considered for the Court since he celebrated his 72nd birthday in
2011.
Because the jurisdictional issue of standing can be result
determinative, a judge's approach to standing is quite
important." Justice Antonin Scalia, who was nominated to the
Court by President Reagan, has proposed a restrictive approach
to standing. As he declared in a law review article written three
years before he joined the Supreme Court in 1986, standing
doctrine is a "crucial and inseparable element" of the
Constitution's separation of powers principles, and that more
restrictive standing rules limit judicial interference with the
popularly elected legislative and executive branches." However,
"his critics argue that he is more concerned with protecting
executive branch decisions from lawsuits than protecting
congressional prerogatives."" In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, invoked
constitutional separation of powers principles to require a
plaintiff seeking standing in a federal court to prove that she has
"suffered an injury in fact," which is "concrete and particularized"
and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."" By
contrast, in his dissenting opinion in Summers v. Earth Island
Institute, Justice Stephen Breyer, who was nominated to the
Supreme Court by Democratic President Clinton, proposed that
the Court adopt a "realistic threat" test for determining when an
available at http://www.robertboynton.com/articleDisplay.phparticlejd=75 (reviewing
RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS (2001)).
11. According to the Federal Judicial Center, Judge Posner was
born in 1939. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, History of the Federal
Judiciary: Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, http://www.uscourts.gov/
JudgesAndJudgeships/BiographicalDirectoryOfJudges.aspx (search "Posner, Richard";
then follow "Posner, Richard Allen" hyperlink).
12. See infra Parts II, IV-VI.
13. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881-82 (1983).
14. LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 320 n.99, 332-35 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing
Justice Scalia's 1983 standing article and reaction to it); Mank, Informational Standing
After Summers, supra note 1, at 3; see JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 128 (2006) (explaining that, compared to the congressional and
judicial branches, "Scalia has not been particularly interested in harnessing the political
power of the executive branch"); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is
Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENvTL. L. 1, 29-30 (2005) (critiquing Justice Scalia's
1983 standing article); Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-Harmonizing
Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENvTL. L. 809, 847 (2002) (same); see also
infra Part IV.A (discussing Justice Scalia's approach to standing and alternative views).
15. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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injury is sufficiently imminent and concrete for standing." Judge
Posner's pragmatic or practical approach to standing is closer to
the probabilistic and liberal standing approach of Justice Breyer
than to the conservative and constitutionally grounded standing
jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, although there are some
differences between the pragmatism of Judge Posner and the
more precedent-oriented pragmatism of Justice Breyer."
Conservative judges prefer a constitutional approach to
standing even if another approach would reach the same result."
For example, Judge Diane Sykes, who was appointed to the
Seventh Circuit by President George W. Bush, a Republican,
wrote a concurring opinion in MainStreet Organization of
Realtors v. Calumet City criticizing Judge Posner for using a
prudential approach to standing rather than Article III
constitutional standing doctrine to deny standing even though
the result was the same in that case." Conservative judges
commonly believe that constitutional standing doctrine more
generally limits suits in federal courts compared to prudential
standing barriers." By contrasting Justice Scalia's separation of
powers views on standing with Judge Posner's practical approach
to standing, one can understand why conservative Republicans
might be reluctant to nominate Judge Posner to the Supreme
Court despite his brilliant record.2'
This Article will show that Judge Posner's practical
approach to standing doctrine is closer to Justice Breyer's
approach than to Justice Scalia's. Nevertheless, there are some
significant differences between Judge Posner and Justice
Breyer.2 In his dissenting opinion in Summers, Justice Breyer
tried to ground his "realistic threat" test for standing in the
Court's existing standing jurisprudence and the broader Anglo-
American common law tradition." By contrast, Judge Posner in
16. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 504-08, 510 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. See infra Parts III.A, IV-VI (highlighting strengths and weaknesses, as well as
similarities and differences, among Scalia's, Posner's, and Breyer's different approaches).
18. See infra Parts II, IV, VI.
19. Compare MainStreet Org. of Realtors v. Calumet City, 505 F.3d 742, 744-49
(7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J., majority opinion) (arguing plaintiffs met Article III
constitutional standing requirements but must be denied standing on prudential standing
grounds), with id. at 749-54 (Sykes, J., concurring) (arguing plaintiffs failed to meet
Article III constitutional standing requirements).
20. See infra Part VI.
21. See infra Parts III.A, IV, VI-VII; see also WILLIAM DOMNARSI, IN THE OPINION
OF THE COURT 147-48 (1996) (discussing the difference between Judge Posner's
philosophy and conservative, Republican philosophy).
22. See infra Parts III.A, V-VI.
23. See infra Part V.
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his American Bottom Conservancy opinion was dismissive of the
Court's constitutional standing precedent and was arguably too
cavalier about ignoring such precedent.4 Furthermore, Judge
Posner failed to explain to what extent his practical approach to
standing is similar to or different from the Court's prudential
standing doctrine.25 Ultimately, Justice Breyer's efforts to
liberalize existing Article III standing doctrine may prove more
fruitful than Judge Posner's approach of abolishing
constitutional standing and replacing it with his proposed
alternative "practical" standing test.26
Part I explains current constitutional and prudential
standing doctrine. Part II.A discusses Judge Posner's criticism of
current Article III standing doctrine in American Bottom
Conservancy and his proposed alternative "practical" approach to
standing. Part II.B puts his views on standing in the larger
context of his pragmatic philosophy of legal decisionmaking. Part
III explores Justice Scalia's separation of powers theory of
standing. Part IV examines Justice Breyer's precedent-based
legal pragmatism and his "realistic threat" standing test in
Summers v. Earth Island Institute. Part V discusses the dispute
between Judge Posner and Judge Sykes about whether the
Seventh Circuit should use a constitutional or prudential
standing doctrine to deny standing in MainStreet and the
implications of that debate for American Bottom Conservancy.
The Conclusion suggests that Justice Breyer's efforts to liberalize
existing Article III standing doctrine may prove more fruitful
than Judge Posner's approach of abolishing constitutional
standing and replacing it with his proposed alternative
"practical" standing test.
II. STANDING BASICS27
A. Constitutional Standing
Although the Constitution does not explicitly require that a
plaintiff possess "standing" to file suit in federal courts, since
1944 the U.S. Supreme Court has inferred from the
Constitution's Article III limitation of judicial decisions to
"Cases" and to "Controversies" that federal courts must utilize
standing requirements to guarantee that the plaintiff has a
24. See infra Part III.A.
25. See infra Part IILA.
26. See infra Parts IIA, V-VI.
27. The discussion of standing in Part II relies upon my earlier standing articles
cited in footnote 1.
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genuine interest and stake in a case." The federal courts have
jurisdiction over a case only if at least one plaintiff can prove
standing for each form of relief sought." A federal court must
dismiss a case without deciding the merits if the plaintiff fails to
meet the constitutional standing test."
Standing requirements are related to broader constitutional
principles. Standing doctrine prohibits unconstitutional advisory
opinions." Furthermore, standing requirements support
separation of powers principles defining the division of powers
between the judiciary and political branches of government so
that the "Federal Judiciary respects 'the proper-and properly
limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."'2 There is
disagreement, however, regarding to what extent separation of
powers principles limit the authority of Congress to authorize
standing to sue in federal courts for private citizens challenging
alleged executive branch underenforcement or nonenforcement of
congressional requirements mandated in a statute.33
28.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States will be a party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of
another State;-between Citizens of different States,-between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (footnote omitted); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332, 340-42 (2006) (explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III's
case and controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations); Stark v. Wickard,
321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944) (stating explicitly the Article III standing requirement in a
Supreme Court case for the first time); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1709-10.
But see Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 650 F.3d 652, 655-56 (7th
Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (questioning whether standing is based on Article III requirements
and citing academic literature). See generally Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation
of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1023, 1036-38 (2009) (discussing the
debate over whether the Constitution implicitly requires standing to sue).
29. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 352-53; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("[Al plaintiff must demonstrate
standing separately for each form of relief sought."); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1,
at 1710.
30. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340-42 (noting that a "case or controversy" is
a prerequisite to reach the merits of the case); Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 ("lW~e
have an obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the
outset of the litigation."); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1710.
31. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340-41; FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998);
Mank, Standing and Future Generations, supra note 1, at 26.
32. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340-41 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
750 (1984)); see also Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1709-10.
33. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992)
(concluding Article III and Article II of the Constitution limit Congress's authority to
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For constitutional standing, the Court has used a three-part
standing test that requires a plaintiff to show that: (1) she has
"suffered an injury in fact," which is "(a) concrete and
particularized" and "(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypotheticall;]" (2) "there [is] a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be
fairly ... tracelable] to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not . .. th[e] result [ofJ the independent action of some third
party not before the court;]" and (3) "it [is] likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision." A plaintiff has the burden of establishing all
three prongs of the standing test.
B. The Uncertainties of Prudential Standing
In addition to constitutional Article III standing
requirements, federal courts may impose prudential standing
requirements to limit unreasonable demands on limited judicial
resources or for other judicial policy reasons." The Supreme
Court has explained the prudential standing doctrine as
follows:
Although we have not exhaustively defined the prudential
dimensions of the standing doctrine, we have explained
that prudential standing encompasses "the general
prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal
rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the
representative branches, and the requirement that a
authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete injury), with id. at 602
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "principal effect" of Justice Scalia's majority
opinion's restrictive approach to standing was "to transfer power into the hands of the
Executive at the expense-not of the courts-but of Congress, from which that power
originates and emanates"). See also Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 459, 496 (2008) (noting the concern that courts should not use standing doctrine
as "a backdoor way to limit Congress's legislative power").
34. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in
original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Mank, supra note 14, at
23-24.
35. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that "parties ... asserting federal
jurisdiction" must "carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III");
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (stating also that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must
carry the burden of establishing standing under Article III); YACKLE, supra note 14, at
336; Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1710.
36. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1997) (describing the "zone of
interests" standard as a "prudential limitation[ I" rather than a mandatory constitutional
requirement); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (stating that prudential
requirements are based "in policy, rather than purely constitutional, considerations");
YACKLE, supra note 14, at 318-19 (stating that prudential limitations are policy-based
"and may be relaxed in some circumstances").
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plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked.07
Congress may enact legislation to override prudential
limitations, but must "expressly negate[ ]" such limitations." The
requirement of express statutory language to override the Court's
prudential standing rules probably does not require the
extraordinary specificity demanded by a clear statement rule of
statutory construction."
The Supreme Court's prudential standing doctrine is
arguably even less defined and more open to interpretation than
its constitutional standing doctrine." In Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "we
have not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the
standing doctrine."" In Newdow, the Court dismissed an
Establishment Clause suit brought by the father of an
elementary school student challenging the constitutionality of a
school district's policy requiring teacher-led recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance.42 The Court recognized the prudential
standing concerns about the appropriateness of federal courts
"entertainling] a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is
founded on family law rights that are in dispute when
prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the
person who is the source of the plaintiffs claimed standing."'
The child's mother, who was the custodial parent, filed a motion
for leave to intervene or to dismiss the complaint, and there were
complex issues based in California family law about the father's
right to influence his daughter's religious upbringing." As a
result of these family law issues, a majority concluded that the
Court should prudentially avoid a case involving family law
matters defined by California domestic relations law.' In his
37. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Allen,
468 U.S. at 751).
38. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162-66 (explaining that "unlike their constitutional
counterparts, [prudential limits on standing] can be modified or abrogated by Congress"
and that prudential limitations must be "expressly negated;" and concluding that a citizen
suit provision abrogated the zone of interest limitation); Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 1, at 676 & n.53.
39. YACKLE, supra note 14, at 386 n.493.
40. See Gregory Bradford, Note, Simplifying State Standing: The Role of Sovereign
Interests in Future Climate Litigation, 52 B.C. L. REv. 1065, 1078-79 (2011) (describing
prudential standing doctrine as "a malleable framework").
41. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12.
42. Id. at 4-5.
43. Id. at 17-18.
44. Id. at 13-17.
45. Id. at 12-18.
80 [50:1
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concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by
Justices O'Connor and Thomas, complained that the majority
had invented a novel prudential standing principle based on "ad
hoc improvisations" to dismiss a troublesome case rather than
developing "general principles" for the doctrine of prudential
standing." The Newdow decision demonstrates that there is
sometimes considerable disagreement on the Court about how to
apply prudential standing principles.
Additionally, the line between constitutional Article III
standing doctrine and prudential standing doctrine is often
unclear." For example, the Supreme Court has been unclear
regarding whether its restriction on suits alleging "generalized
grievances," a term which courts sometimes use to refer to suits
involving large segments of the public or to suits where a citizen
who has no personal injury seeks to force the government to obey
a duly enacted law, is a prudential limitation or a constitutional
one." In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., for example, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a
court could deny standing in a suit involving generalized harms
to large numbers of the public because such a suit would raise
46. Id. at 18-19, 24-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
47. See Bradford, supra note 40, at 1079-80.
48. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV.
677, 692 (1990) (arguing the Court's distinction between prudential and constitutional
standing is often arbitrary); Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized
Grievance Fail a Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12
LEwIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2008) (arguing the Court sometimes shifts the line
between prudential and constitutional standing, especially in generalized grievances
cases).
49. Courts have failed to precisely define what constitutes a "generalized
grievance." YACKLE, supra note 14, at 342 ("The 'generalized grievance' formulation is
notoriously ambiguous."); Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized
Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1884 (1996)
("Beyond the uncertainty about whether generalized grievances are constitutional or
prudential limitations, there is also uncertainty about their precise definition.").
50. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 634 n.5 (2007)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that the Court "has occasionally in dicta described the
prohibition on generalized grievances as merely a prudential bar," but explaining that the
doctrine "squarely rest[s] on Article III considerations, as the analysis in
Lujan . . . confirms"); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (implying that the ban
on generalized grievance suits is an Article III limitation (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992))); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-77; YACKLE, supra note
14, at 342-45 (discussing the debate in the Supreme Court regarding if the rule against
generalized grievances is a constitutional rule or a nonconstitutional policy waivable by
Congress); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1710-15 (discussing confusion over
whether the Court's standing cases prohibiting generalized grievances are constitutional
or prudential limitations); Solimine, supra note 28, at 1027 & n.14; Stern, supra note 48,
at 1173 ("The generalized grievance test appears sometimes as a constitutional doctrine,
sometimes as prudential, and sometimes as a bit of both, repeatedly resisting stable
classification."); Guilds, supra note 49, at 1875-76, 1878-84.
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"general prudential concerns 'about the proper-and properly
limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
Subsequently, however, in Public Citizen v. United States
Department of Justice, the Court rejected the argument that the
plaintiffs were barred from standing because they alleged a
generalized grievance shared by many other citizens." The Court
stated:
The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might
make the same complaint after unsuccessfully demanding
disclosure under FACA [(Federal Advisory Committee Act)]
does not lessen appellants' asserted injury, any more than
the fact that numerous citizens might request the same
information under the Freedom of Information Act entails
that those who have been denied access do not possess a
53
sufficient basis to sue.
The Public Citizen decision did not mention Duke Power's
rejection of suits asserting generalized grievances shared by
many others.54 Because the Court has never precisely defined the
term "generalized grievances" and whether the bar against them
is a flexible judicial prudential doctrine or a firmer constitutional
rule, it is difficult to decide whether the Public Citizen and Duke
Power decisions are merely in tension with each other or actually
contradict each other."
In Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the Government
argued that the plaintiffs, who sought information from the
Federal Election Commission because the information allegedly
could assist their voting decisions, should not have standing
because they had suffered only a generalized grievance common
to all other voters." The Court rejected the Government's
argument that the informational injury to the plaintiffs was too
abstract or generalized to constitute a concrete injury or that it
violated judicially imposed prudential norms against generalized
grievances because the statute specifically authorized the right of
voters to request information from the Commission and,
51. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978)
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2006) (amending the Price-Anderson Act to allow
individual claims arising out of "nuclear incidents"); Mank, supra note 14, at 21-22.
52. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1989).
53. Id. at 449-50.
54. See id. at 440-89.
55. See YACKLE, supra note 14, at 342 (illustrating conflicting definitions of
"generalized grievance" the Court has advanced); Solimine, supra note 28, at 1027
(explaining that the Court "has not been clear what [generalized] grievances are" and that
"the line between [Article III and prudential] requirements is not always clear").
56. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-21, 23 (1998).
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therefore, overrode any prudential standing limitations against
generalized grievances." The Court distinguished prior cases
that had imposed judicially imposed prudential norms against
generalized grievances by reasoning that it would deny
standing for widely shared, generalized injuries only if the
harm is both widely shared and of "an abstract and indefinite
nature-for example, harm to the 'common concern for
obedience to law.'"" Akins stated that Article III standing was
permissible even if many people suffered similar injuries as
long as those injuries were concrete and not abstract." The
Court declared that the fact that "an injury is widely
shared . .. does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an
interest for Article III purposes. Such an interest, where
sufficiently concrete, may count as an 'injury in fact.'"'o
Accordingly, the Akins decision recognized that a plaintiff who
suffers a concrete, actual injury may sue even though many
others have suffered similar injuries:
[Tihe fact that a political forum may be more readily
available where an injury is widely shared .. . does not,
by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article
III purposes .. .. This conclusion seems particularly
obvious where (to use a hypothetical example) large
numbers of individuals suffer the same common-law
injury (say, a widespread mass tort), or where large
numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights
conferred by law.6 1
Akins's broad acceptance of suits involving widespread
injuries has not been accepted by all members of the Court. In
his dissenting opinion in Akins, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Thomas, argued that Article III prohibits all
generalized grievances, even ones involving concrete injuries,
57. Id. at 19-20; see Kimberly N. Brown, What's Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits
and the Battle for Judicial Review, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 677, 677-78 (2007); Mank,
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 717.
58. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23 (quoting L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S.
295, 303 (1940)). The Supreme Court has not been clear on whether generalized
grievances pose a constitutional or prudential barrier to standing, and the issue has been
subject to much debate. Solimine, supra note 28, at 1027 & n.14. The Akins decision
implied that the rule against generalized grievances is only prudential in nature, but did
not explicitly decide the issue. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 19-20, 24-25; accord Mank,
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 717.
59. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1,
at 717.
60. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added); Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 1, at 717.
61. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 1, at 717-18.
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because plaintiffs must demonstrate a "particularized" injury
that "'affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way."'6 2
He contended that the Akins plaintiffs' alleged informational
injury was an 'undifferentiated' generalized grievance that was
"'common to all members of the public'" and, therefore, that they
must resolve it "by political, rather than judicial, means." More
broadly, Justice Scalia dissented in Akins because he argued that
generalized injuries to a large portion of the public are inherently
unsuitable for judicial resolution and must be addressed by the
political branches of government, and especially the Executive
Branch, under both Article III and the President's Article II
authority.4
Some commentators have argued that the Court's distinction
between constitutional and prudential standing sometimes rests
only on the Court's arbitrary determination to classify an issue
as constitutional or prudential for its convenience without any
genuine logical basis." For example, the Court's first major case
denying taxpayer standing, Frothingham v. Mellon, held that an
individual taxpayer generally cannot sue the government to
challenge how tax dollars are appropriated because his
generalized interest in government expenditures "is shared with
millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable;
and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the
funds, [is] so remote, fluctuating and uncertain."" In its
subsequent Flast v. Cohen opinion, the Court acknowledged that
62. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)); Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 1, at 719.
63. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974)); accord Mank, supra note 14, at 39; Mank,
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719.
64. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 1, at 719; see also Brown, supra note 57, at 703-04.
65.
But what makes some requirements constitutional and the others prudential?
For example, why are injury, causation, and redressability deemed
constitutionally mandated, but the rules against third party standing and
generalized grievance merely prudential? None are mentioned in the
Constitution. All are created by the Court because they are viewed as prudent
limits on federal judicial power. Each is of quite recent origin. So what makes
some constitutional and the others prudential? The only apparent answer
sounds terribly cynical: a requirement is constitutional if the Court says it is,
and it is prudential if the Court says it is that. Nothing in the content of the
doctrines explains their constitutional or prudential status.
Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 692; see also Elliot, supra note, at 515-17 (noting the
current standing test "has little logical relationship to the purposes [it] is supposed to
serve").
66. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
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the Frothingham decision could be read to rely on either
constitutional Article III or prudential standing doctrine to deny
standing, but the Flast decision preferred to read Frothingham
as using prudential or policy reasons to deny taxpayer standing."
Even today, the Court has not clearly explained whether the
general prohibition against taxpayer suits is based on
constitutional or prudential considerations," although recent
Court decisions have emphasized constitutional barriers to
taxpayer standing." In Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc., Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion, which
was joined by Justice Thomas, argued that the Court should
overrule Flast and squarely hold that the bar against taxpayer
standing is constitutional and not just prudential."
From opposite positions, both Justice Scalia's strong
emphasis on using constitutional standing doctrine as the
primary basis for standing rules and Judge Posner's
diametrically opposite view would have the advantage of
clarifying the Court's current muddled compromise between
constitutional and prudential standing doctrine. For example,
Justice Scalia's approach of adopting a completely Article III
constitutional barrier to standing in taxpayer cases would have
the advantage of eliminating confusion about the basis for the
prohibition against taxpayer standing." From the opposite
perspective, Judge Posner's proposal in American Bottom
Conservancy to eliminate constitutional standing principles
would also have the virtue of eliminating the difficult problem of
delineating the line between constitutional Article III and
prudential standing barriers." One problem with Judge Posner's
approach to standing in his American Bottom Conservancy
opinion, however, is that he failed to explain to what extent his
practical approach to standing is similar to or different from the
67. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-94 (1968); Solimine, supra note 28, at 1042
(suggesting that Flast interpreted the Frothingham decision as a prudential rather than a
constitutional standing case).
68. Anne Abramowitz, A Remedy for Every Right: What Federal Courts Can Learn
From California's Taxpayer Standing, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1595, 1605-06 (2010).
69. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441-49 (2011)
(discussing Article III barriers to taxpayer standing); Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 611-12 (2007) (asserting that the requirements for taxpayer
standing are based on constitutional separation of powers concerns).
70. Hein, 551 U.S. at 618, 634 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring); accord Ariz. Christian
Sch. Tuition Org., 131 S. Ct. at 1449-50 (Scalia, J., concurring) (reiterating his view in
Hein that the Court should overrule Flast and reject taxpayer standing on constitutional
grounds); Solimine, supra note 28, at 1045.
71. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 618, 637. (Scalia, J., concurring).
72. See infra Part III.A (discussing Judge Posner's use of his practical standing test
as an alternative to the current constitutional standing test).
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Court's prudential standing doctrine.
C. The Politics of Standing
Arguably, Democratic presidents are likely to appoint judges
with different views on standing and other controversial issues
than Republican presidents." Some empirical studies have found
statistically significant differences in judicial voting patterns
between federal judges appointed respectively by either a
Democratic or a Republican president, although the party of
appointment is more significant on average for some issues than
others, and not all judges who are appointed by a particular
party have the same views.74 There is conflicting evidence about
whether the party of appointment affects how federal courts of
appeals judges vote in standing cases." Professor Cross has
73. Some presidents have openly expressed their views on wanting judges to
vote a certain way. President Reagan, who served in office from 1981 until 1989,
stated that his goal was to appoint a federal judiciary "made up of judges who believe
in law and order and a strict interpretation of the Constitution." O'Brien, supra note
6, at 60-62 (quoting President Reagan's Message to the National Convention of the
Knights of Columbus on August 5, 1986). President Eisenhower, a Republican,
allegedly complained that his appointments of Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice
William J. Brennan, who became two of the greatest "liberal" justices in the Court's
history, were the two worst mistakes of his presidency, although whether he actually
made that statement is the subject of some dispute. KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR
ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA
158-59 (1993) (reporting President Eisenhower in 1958 probably did not tell retiring
Supreme Court Justice Harold Burton that the appointment of Chief Justice Earl
Warren and Justice William J. Brennan were the two worst mistakes of his
presidency because of their "liberal" approaches to judicial decisions, despite later
rumors to that effect, but recounting that President Eisenhower did tell Justice
Burton that he wanted Burton's replacement to have a "conservative attitude" about
judicial ideology); SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL
CHAMPION 138-39 (2010) (reporting controversy about whether President Eisenhower
called the appointment of Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan
the two worst mistakes of his presidency because of their "liberal" approaches to
judicial decisions and also reporting that President Eisenhower did seek a more
conservative justice to replace Justice Burton in 1958).
74. See generally FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS 22-23 (2007) ("The pattern of [the empirical testing] results is consistent with a
finding that presidential ideologies are reflected in the ideologies of their judicial
appointees. The Republican appointees were consistently more conservative, on average,
than the Democratic appointees."); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 11-12 passim (2006) (analyzing 6,408
published three-judge federal court of appeals decisions during approximately the 1995-
2004 period and finding statistical significant differences in judicial voting between
Democratic and Republican appointees in several subject areas, but not in other subject
areas, including standing questions). Professor Cross cautions, however, that not all
Republican or Democratic presidents have the same views as other presidents of the same
party and that judges do not perfectly replicate the ideologies of the presidents who
appoint them or the senators who confirm them. CROSS, supra, at 19-20.
75. Compare CROSS, supra note 74, at 185-86 (finding tentative empirical evidence
that Republican judges are more likely to deny standing than Democratic judges), and
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cautioned that more empirical data is needed on how judges vote
on procedural issues like standing. Nevertheless, Parts I.C, III,
IV, and V will suggest that Justice Scalia's narrow approach to
constitutional standing is now the norm for judges appointed by
Republican presidents and Justice Breyer's broader view of
standing is generally typical for most judges appointed by
Democratic presidents."
Ironically, some commentators argue that "liberal justices"
appointed by Democratic presidents invented modern Article III
standing doctrine during the 1930s and early 1940s as a means
to limit challenges to administrative decisions by "New Deal"
agencies created by Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
although these scholars disagree somewhat on the details and
timing of how and when liberal justices sought to limit
standing." Professor Ho and Ms. Ross contend, "Rather than
supporting the conservative goal of keeping broad-based public
interest litigation out of court, restrictive standing requirements
may originally have achieved precisely the opposite result:
preserving and enshrining the liberal New Deal administrative
state."" Professor Winter argues, "The liberals were interested in
protecting the legislative sphere from judicial interference. Their
goal was to assure that the state and federal governments would
be free to experiment with progressive legislation."o
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1759-60 (1999)
(finding empirical evidence that, for environmental plaintiffs, Republican judges are more
likely to deny standing than Democratic judges), with SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 74, at
53-54 (finding no statistically significant differences between Republican and Democratic
appointees serving on the D.C. Circuit on standing issues).
76. CROSS, supra note 74, at 186.
77. See infra Parts II.C, IV-VI.
78. See Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative
Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 557 (2012); Daniel E.
Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical
Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 594-99, 604-07,
634-44 (2010) (arguing that cases from the 1930s and early 1940s provide substantial
support for the insulation thesis that liberal Democratic justices favored limited
standing); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 179-81 (1992) ("[T]he principal early architects of
what we now consider standing limits were Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter[, who were
both appointed by Democratic presidents]. Their goal was to insulate progressive and
New Deal legislation from frequent judicial attack." (footnote omitted)); Steven L. Winter,
The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,
1374, 1456-57 (1988).
79. Ho & Ross, supra note 78, at 595; accord Elliott, supra note 78, at 557.
80. Winter, supra note 78, at 1456; see also Elliott, supra note 78, at 557
(referencing Winter's discussion of the liberal justices' use of standing to protect New Deal
programs); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-
Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 458-59 (1996) ("[Justice] Brandeis's
disciple Felix Frankfurter, who became a Justice in 1939, led a rapidly emerging majority
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Professor Ho and Ms. Ross argue that after 1950 liberal
justices began to favor broader standing rights and conservatives
began to favor a narrower standing doctrine, asserting: "By 1950,
the doctrine's political valence reversed entirely. Compared to
votes in cases on the merits, liberals were uniformly more likely
to favor-and conservatives more likely to deny-standing."1 For
example, they argue that Justices Black and Douglas, both
appointed to the Supreme Court by President Roosevelt in the
late 1930s, initially favored restrictive standing, but then favored
a broad approach to standing after 1950.2
Other scholars might disagree with Professor Ho and Ms.
Ross about the exact timing, but they agree with the general
trend that by the 1970s liberal justices appointed by mostly
Democratic presidents favored broad standing rights for
plaintiffs while more narrow standing was favored by more
conservative judges usually appointed by Republican
presidents." For example, according to Justice Scalia's standing
article published in 1983, during the 1970s, liberal judges and
justices mostly appointed by Democratic presidents favored
broad standing, especially in environmental cases.' His article
criticized the 1971 D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission" for beginning "the judiciary's long love
affair with environmental litigation."" Furthermore, he criticized
a series of Supreme Court cases during the 1970s that
reinterpreted the Administrative Procedure Act to allow a
plaintiff to sue whenever he is within the prudential "'zone of
of FDR appointees in fostering the New Deal by minimizing judicial interference with the
political departments through the justiciability doctrines. For example, the Court
embraced the Brandeisian strategy of invoking justiciability to shield progressive
legislation from conservative substantive due process challenges." (footnotes omitted)).
But see Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 309, 370 n.187 (1995) (criticizing Winters for not addressing the further
development of the standing doctrine under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts).
81. Ho & Ross, supra note 78, at 596.
82. Id. at 596, 643-45.
83. See William S. Jordan, III, Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the Administrative
State: Lessons from a Decade of Hard Look Remands of EPA Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 45,
46, 49 (2001) (noting study of 1970-1990 decisions conducted by Revesz concluding that
"ideology significantly influences judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit"); Elizabeth
Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1151, 1174-78 (2009)
(classifying the 1970s a time of bold change in the laws of standing and implying that
Judge Powell's appearance on the Court initiated the movement to narrow standing).
84. See Scalia, supra note 13, at 884-890, 897.
85. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
86. Scalia, supra note 13, at 884.
87. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
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interests' that the statute seeks to protect."' His article shows,
however, that between the mid 1970s and early 1980s more
conservative justices, mostly appointed by Republican presidents,
sought to return constitutional standing doctrine to the narrower
view followed before the 1970s."9 In 1986, President Reagan's
appointment of Justice Scalia to the Court provided a brilliant
intellectual to lead a conservative movement on the Court for a
narrower constitutional standing doctrine based upon separation
of powers principles.'
Professor Elliott, in a recent article, has suggested that
conservative judges might rethink their narrow approach to
standing in light of the difficulties conservative plaintiffs
challenging or defending same-sex marriage laws, federal health
care legislation, or stem cell research have found in meeting
standing requirements." But she concedes that there is no evidence
yet that leading conservative justices are rethinking their views on
standing to make it easier for conservative plaintiffs to gain
standing.92 As Parts II, III, IV, and V will explain, Judge Posner's
practical approach to standing issues is at odds with Justice Scalia's
narrower constitutional standing doctrine based upon separation of
powers principles, and is closer to Justice Breyer's "realistic threat"
approach to standing, although there are significant differences
between Judge Posner and Justice Breyer in their approaches to
pragmatic constitutional and legal reasoning. Judge Posner's
pragmatic approach to standing may be one reason why he has
never been appointed to the Supreme Court because Justice Scalia's
approach to standing has come to define the views of "conservative"
judges who are acceptable for appointment by Republican
presidents."
III. JUDGE POSNER'S "PRACTICAL" STANDING THEORY IN
AMERICAN BOTTOM CONSERVANCY
In American Bottom Conservancy, Judge Posner questioned
the constitutional doctrine of standing in federal courts and
instead argued that the "solidest grounds" for the doctrine of
standing are "practical."" As will be discussed below, the Seventh
88. Scalia, supra note 13, at 887-90.
89. See id. at 897-99; Elliot, supra note 78, at 555-59.
90. See infra Part IV.
91. Elliott, supra note 78, at 565-72, 575-78, 583-86.
92. Id. at 586-89.
93. See infra Parts IV, VI-VII.
94. Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs., 650 F.3d 652, 655-56
(7th Cir. 2011).
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Circuit likely could have reached the same result regarding
standing irrespective of whether it applied a constitutional
Article III or "practical" standing test." Accordingly, Judge
Posner was likely seeking to convince other federal judges,
including the Supreme Court, to adopt his practical standing test
in lieu of its current constitutional Article III standing test."
Judge Posner's call for a practical standing test is consistent
with his general pragmatic approach to legal decisionmaking. A
weakness of Judge Posner's pragmatic approach in his American
Bottom Conservancy opinion was that he was arguably too
dismissive of the Court's constitutional standing precedent. A
more truly pragmatic approach might be found in Justice
Breyer's attempt in Summers to fashion a realistic approach to
standing from the Court's existing precedent. Additionally, Judge
Posner in his American Bottom Conservancy opinion failed to
explain to what extent his practical approach to standing is
similar to or different from the Court's prudential standing
doctrine.
A. Judge Posner's "Practical" Standing Theory in American
Bottom Conservancy
In American Bottom Conservancy, an environmental
organization, American Bottom Conservancy, filed suit against
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers seeking to invalidate a federal
permit granted to Waste Management of Illinois, Inc. authorizing
it to destroy eighteen acres of wetlands in the American Bottom,
a floodplain of the Mississippi River in Southwestern Illinois."
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois, in a decision by Judge Patrick Murphy, "dismissed the
suit without prejudice on the ground that the Conservancy had
not established standing to sue under Article III of the
Constitution."" The Seventh Circuit, however, held that American
Bottom Conservancy had standing to sue and, accordingly, reversed
the district court's decision."
1. Judge Posner Questions Constitutional Standing
Doctrine. In American Bottom Conservancy, Judge Posner's decision
questioned three different grounds articulated by the U.S. Supreme
95. See infra Part III.A.
96. See infra Part III.A.
97. Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 654-55. "The Corps granted the permit on
condition that Waste Management create double the amount of wetlands on a nearby
tract that it owns." Id. at 654.
98. Id. at 655.
99. Id. at 656-60.
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Court for the constitutional doctrine of standing in federal courts.'00
First, he observed: "Some of the most frequently mentioned grounds
for the constitutional doctrine of standing are tenuous, such as that
it is derived from Article III's limitation of the federal judicial power
to 'Cases' and 'Controversies."'o By concluding that the "'Cases' and
'Controversies"' rationale was tenuous,o2 Judge Posner questioned a
long line of Supreme Court precedent, including its 2008 decision in
Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc. 's and its 1998
decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment."' In
Sprint Communications, Justice Breyer declared: "We begin with
the most basic doctrinal principles: Article III, § 2, of the
Constitution restricts the federal 'judicial Power' to the resolution of
'Cases' and 'Controversies.' That case-or-controversy requirement is
satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing.' 05 In Steel Co., Justice
Scalia invoked his textualist approach to interpretation in
endorsing the same constitutional limitation on standing:
Article III, § 2, of the Constitution extends the 'judicial
Power' of the United States only to "Cases" and
"Controversies." We have always taken this to mean
cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable
to, and resolved by, the judicial process. Such a meaning
is fairly implied by the text, since otherwise the
purported restriction upon the judicial power would
scarcely be a restriction at all.c6
By questioning the "'Cases' and 'Controversies' rationale for
standing, Judge Posner effectively disagreed with Justice Breyer,
Justice Scalia, and long-standing Supreme Court precedent.0  It
is certainly unusual for a federal court of appeals judge to
question clear Supreme Court precedent, but Judge Posner is a
unique intellect who apparently is not afraid to raise questions
where other lower court judges might fear to tread.
The other two rationales for constitutional standing
questioned by Judge Posner are not quite as strong precedent as
the "'Cases' and 'Controversies'" rationale for standing, but still
100. Id. at 655-56.
101. Id. at 655 (citing Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273-
75 (2008); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998); D.L.S. v. Utah,
374 F.3d 971, 974 (10th Cir. 2004)).
102. Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 665.
103. Sprint Commc'ns, 554 U.S. at 273-75.
104. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102.
105. Sprint Commc'ns, 554 U.S. at 273.
106. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 (citation omitted).
107. Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 655.
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enjoy some support."' Justice Frankfurter in 1939, and again in
1951, justified standing as based on "the practice of the English
royal courts, on which the federal judiciary was modeled."09 The
modern Supreme Court has not necessarily adopted Justice
Frankfurter's precise interpretation of English common law
practice, but has generally endorsed the use of history in deciding
which cases fall within the jurisdiction of federal Article III
courts. In Sprint Communications, Justice Breyer declared:
We have often said that history and tradition offer a
meaningful guide to the types of cases that Article III
empowers federal courts to consider. See, e.g., Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)
("We have always taken [the case-or-controversy
requirement] to mean cases and controversies of the sort
traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial
process" (emphasis added)); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 382
(1980) ("The purpose of the case-or-controversy requirement
is to limit the business of federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process"
(emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted));
cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.) (in crafting Article III, "the
framers ... gave merely the outlines of what were to them
the familiar operations of the English judicial system and
its manifestations on this side of the ocean before the
Union"). Consequently, we here have carefully examined
how courts have historically treated suits by assignors and
*110
assignees.
Judge Posner's questioning of a historical justification for a
108. See id. at 655-56.
109. See id at 655 (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460-61 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 150-51 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Bradley S. Clanton, Standing
and the English Prerogative Writs: The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001,
1031-32 (1997) (observing that eighteenth century English court practice supports the
standing doctrine's "personal stake" requirement).
110. Sprint Commc'ns, 554 U.S. at 274-75 (alteration in original). Professors
Woolhandler and Nelson have suggested that modem standing doctrine has some support
in history, even if history does not compel the precise formulation adopted by the current
Supreme Court. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine?, 102 MicH. L. REV. 689, 691-92 (2004) (arguing that standing doctrine has
historical antecedents dating back to eighteenth and nineteenth century courts, although
history did not compel the precise standing doctrine used by the Supreme Court). But see
Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1543-45
(2008) (questioning historical evidence for and constitutional basis for modern standing
requirements, but acknowledging that Woolhandler and Nelson may have some basis for
showing historical distinction between treatment of public versus private suits).
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constitutional standing doctrine appears to be contrary to
Supreme Court precedent."'
The third rationale for constitutional standing questioned by
Judge Posner is that "lawsuits wouldn't be vigorously litigated,
with the requisite adverseness, unless they involved 'tangible'
stakes.""' In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., the Supreme Court stated
that a plaintiff must have a personal stake in the case rather
than a theoretical interest:
The Art. III aspect of standing also reflects a due
regard for the autonomy of those persons likely to be most
directly affected by a judicial order. The federal courts have
abjured appeals to their authority which would convert the
judicial process into "no more than a vehicle for the
vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders."
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973). Were the
federal courts merely publicly funded forums for the
ventilation of public grievances or the refinement of
jurisprudential understanding, the concept of "standing"
would be quite unnecessary. But the "cases and
controversies" language of Art. III forecloses the conversion
of courts of the United States into judicial versions of
college debating forums. As we said in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972):
"The requirement that a party seeking review must
allege facts showing that he is himself adversely
affected ... does serve as at least a rough attempt to
put the decision as to whether review will be sought in
the hands of those who have a direct stake in the
outcome."
The exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly
affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom
it extends, is therefore restricted to litigants who can
show "injury in fact" resulting from the action which
they seek to have the court adjudicate."
111. Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 655-56 ("I have encountered no case
before 1807 in which the standing of the plaintiff is mooted, though the lists of cases in
the digests strongly suggest the possibility that the plaintiff in some of them was without
a personal interest." (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Public
Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1270 (1961))); Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public
Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 827 (1969).
112. Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 655 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); O'Sullivan v. City of Chicago, 396 F.3d 843, 853, 868 (7th
Cir. 2005); Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas (CATA) v. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
995 F.2d 510, 513 (4th Cir. 1993)).
113. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473.
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Judge Posner appeared to question whether a plaintiff needs to
have a direct stake in a case to have constitutional standing."4
Perhaps because he is a former academic who still teaches
law at the University of Chicago Law School as a Senior Lecturer
in Law,"' Judge Posner in American Bottom Conservancy gives
more weight to academic criticisms of constitutional standing
doctrine than most other judges probably would."' He writes: "All
three of these grounds [for constitutional standing doctrine] have
been subjected to strong criticisms by reputable scholars.""' He
then cites Charles Alan Wright's treatise on Federal Practice and
Procedure and several law review articles."' The sources cited by
Judge Posner do raise serious questions about the Supreme
Court's constitutional standing doctrine. For example, Wright's
treatise observes: "All of these [standing] concepts, both
constitutional and prudential, are slippery. Difficult tasks of
judgment are required, invoking an elaboration of competing
judicial philosophies that leads often to hot dispute and
114. Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 655-56 (citing 13A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.3 (3d ed. 2008); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public
Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 24-26 (1982)).
115. Senior Lecturers, UNIV. OF CHI. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/all/all/Senior%20Lecturers (last visited Sept.
8, 2012) (listing Judge Posner as a Senior Lecturer in Law); Richard A. Posner: Courses
and Seminars, UNIV. OF CH. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/node/79/courses (last
visited Sept. 8, 2012) (listing Judge Posner's courses and seminars).
116. Judge Posner has observed that most federal judges are not much interested in
their evaluation by law professors because modern academic literature usually does not
effectively understand the judicial process. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOw JUDGES THINK 204-
29 (2008) (explaining why judges are not law professors).
117. Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 655.
118.
On whether standing can be grounded in limitations implicit in Article III's case
or controversy requirement see 13A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3531.1, pp. 56-57 (3d ed. 2008); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., "Article
III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts," 69
Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 512-17 (1994); Steven L. Winter, "The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance," 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1376-77
and n.26, 1418-25 (1988). On whether it can be grounded in the practice of
English royal courts and early American courts see id.; Louis L. Jaffe, "Standing
To Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions," 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1265, 1270 (1961)
("I have encountered no case before 1807 in which the standing of the plaintiff is
mooted, though the lists of cases in the digests strongly suggest the possibility
that the plaintiff in some of them was without a personal interest"); Raoul
Berger, "Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?,"
78 Yale L.J. 816, 827 (1969). And on whether it can be grounded in fear that
parties without a tangible stake would litigate with insufficient energy see 13A
Charles Alan Wright et al., supra, § 3531.3, pp. 126-28; Abram Chayes, "The
Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court," 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 24-26 (1982).
Id. at 655-56.
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sometimes to disingenuous manipulation."" Professor Pushaw
found no basis for a "case" and "controversy" limitation in the
Supreme Court's early decisions, declaring:
The foregoing analysis of eighteenth and nineteenth
century sources reveals that "case" and "controversy" had
different meanings related to judicial functions.
Interestingly, no contemporary American legal figure ever
suggested that Article III's reference to "Cases" and
"Controversies" was intended as a constitutional limitation
on federal jurisdiction. Most importantly, the early
Supreme Court never interpreted Article III's language that
way in its discussions of "justiciability" concepts.120
Similarly, Professor Winter complains:
One legitimately may wonder how a constitutional
[standing] doctrine now said to inhere in article III's "case
or controversy" language could be so late in making an
appearance, do so with so skimpy a pedigree, and take so
long to be recognized even by the primary academic
expositors of the law of federal courts.'
Unlike most federal judges, Judge Posner would apparently
prefer to give more weight to a well-reasoned law review article
than a poorly reasoned Supreme Court decision.12 By contrast, in
recent years, most federal judges have become less likely to cite
law review articles in their decisions than in the 1970s or even
the 1990s.'
2. Judge Posner Proposes a Practical Theory of
Standing. After questioning the Supreme Court's constitutional
standing doctrine, Judge Posner proposed an alternative
119. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 114, § 3531.1, at 92.
120. Robert J. Pushaw, Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 512 (1994).
121. Winter, supra note 78, at 1377.
122. See Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 655-56 (citing five law review articles
and one treatise to critique case law supporting constitutional doctrine of standing).
123. See Brent E. Newton, Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First-
Century Supreme Court Justices: An Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399, 401-09
(2012) (reporting an empirical study of nearly two thousand Supreme Court opinions,
including concurring and dissenting opinions, from 2001 to 2011, which found that
Justices currently cited law review articles less frequently than during the 1970s and
1980s, citing, on average, 0.52 articles per opinion from 2001 to 2011 compared to 0.87
articles per opinion in the early 1970s); Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges
Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 ("In the 1970s,
federal courts cited articles from The Harvard Law Review 4,410 times, according to a
new report by the staff of The Cardozo Law Review. In the 1990s, the number of citations
dropped by more than half, to 1,956. So far in this decade: 937. Patterns at other leading
law reviews are similar. And the drop in the number of citations understates the
phenomenon, as the courts' caseload has exploded in the meantime.").
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"practical" theory of standing. He wrote: "This isn't to say that
the doctrine of standing isn't well grounded. But the solidest
grounds are practical (just like the avowedly prudential grounds
for judge-made supplements to the Article III standard,
MainStreet Organization of Realtors v. Calumet City, 505 F.3d
742, 744-46 (7th Cir. 2007))."'1' Part VI will discuss Judge
Posner's prudential standing decision in MainStreet, the
possible similarities and differences between prudential
standing doctrine and his "practical" standing theory, and
Judge Sykes's concurring opinion in that case criticizing Judge
Posner's refusal to use constitutional standing doctrine. As will
be discussed, Judge Posner's American Bottom Conservancy
decision goes beyond his MainStreet decision by openly
acknowledging his doubts about constitutional standing
doctrine and his preference for an alternative "practical" theory
of standing that bears some resemblance to prudential standing
doctrine, but may go beyond its current boundaries.
Unfortunately, Judge Posner does not clearly define to what
extent his practical approach to standing is similar to or
different from existing prudential standing doctrine; possibly,
he prefers a practical approach to standing rather than the
established prudential doctrine because his approach gives him
more flexibility to decide future cases as he sees fit.
In American Bottom Conservancy, Judge Posner explained
that standing doctrine was needed for various practical reasons:
The doctrine is needed to limit premature judicial
interference with legislation, to prevent the federal courts
from being overwhelmed by cases, and to ensure that the
legal remedies of primary victims of wrongful conduct will
not be usurped by persons trivially or not at all harmed by
the wrong complained of."'
It is pertinent to examine the sources that Judge Posner cites to
support his practical reasoning justification.'26 The single
124. Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 656.
125. Id.
126. Judge Posner's cited sources are as follows:
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., supra, 454 U.S. at 473 ..; North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d
1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1991); Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, "Did Liberal Justices
Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing,
1921-2006," 62 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 597-99, 604-07 (2010); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
"The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-And Their Connections to
Substantive Rights," 92 Va. L. Rev. 633, 673-74 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein,
"What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 'Injuries,' and Article III," 91
Mich. L. Rev. 163, 179-80 (1992). "During the twentieth century, courts became
self-conscious about the concept of standing only after developments in the legal
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Supreme Court decision he cites, Valley Forge, relies upon Article
III's "cases and controversies" language rather than prudential
standing doctrine, although arguably the opinion uses that
language to achieve the practical result of using standing to
prevent federal courts from becoming "college debating
forums."' More on point for his practical standing argument,
Judge Posner cites his own 1991 decision in North Shore Gas Co.
v. EPA, where he declared that "probabilistic benefit from
winning a suit is enough 'injury in fact' to confer standing in the
undemanding Article III sense.""' By contrast, Justice Scalia
rejected "probabilistic" standing in his 2009 Summers decision
and would never describe Article III standing as an
"undemanding" requirement.'" On the other hand, Justice
Breyer accepted "probabilistic standing" in his Summers
dissenting opinion when he proposed a "realistic threat" test for
standing."o
Judge Posner also cited three law review articles and one
casebook as supporting his practical standing proposal."' One
law review that he cites discusses how and why the prudential
standing doctrine normally precludes suits by third parties;32
Judge Posner's citation of that article suggests that he sees the
prudential standing doctrine as consistent in many cases with his
practical standing approach. Two articles and one casebook cited
by Judge Posner suggest that standing is an artificial doctrine
created to address new types of litigation arising from the New
Deal's creation of modern administrative agencies during the
1930s."' If standing doctrine is really a judge-made concept
designed to address the contingencies of a judicial era rather
than a constitutional doctrine set in stone by the Constitution's
culture subjected the private law model to unfamiliar strains." Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
114 (7th ed. 2009).
Id.
127. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982).
128. N. Shore Gas Co. v. E.P.A., 930 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1991) (citations
omitted).
129. See infra Part IV.
130. See infra Part V.
131. Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 656.
132. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-
And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 673-74 (2006) ("The
Supreme Court has established a bar to third-party standing as a prudential requirement
or rule of self-restraint, partly rooted in policies of constitutional avoidance.").
133. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 114 (6th ed. 2009); Ho & Ross, supra note 78, at 597-99, 604-
07; Sunstein, supra note 78, at 179-80.
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text and historical practice, as these scholarly works suggest,
then it would be reasonable for federal judges like Judge Posner
to modify standing doctrine as practical circumstances demand."'
There is strong scholarly support for Judge Posner's practical
standing theory, but his citation of Valley Forge, which relies on
Article III's "cases and controversies" language rather than
prudential standing doctrine, is far more questionable.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's admonition in that case that
Article III constitutional standing doctrine prevents federal
courts from becoming "merely publicly funded forums for the
ventilation of public grievances or the refinement of
jurisprudential understanding" does have a practical aspect that
fits Judge Posner's standing theory i n part."'
Judge Posner suggested that his practical standing doctrine
would often reach the same result as existing standing doctrine
to bar suits from bystanders with no stake in a case. 3 ' He wrote:
Consistent with the practical as well as doctrinal
thinking behind the requirement of standing, a plaintiff, to
establish Article III standing to sue, must allege, and if the
allegation is contested must present evidence, that the
relief he seeks will if granted avert or mitigate or
compensate him for an injury-though not necessarily a
great injury-caused or likely to be caused by the
defendant. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 . .. (1992). Imagine an environmental group located
in California suing to prevent the Corps of Engineers
from granting a permit to destroy wetlands at the North
Milam site even though no member of the group planned
ever to visit the American Bottom. The suit might be
brought before American Bottom Conservancy brought its
own suit and the Conservancy's suit might be
overshadowed by the suit by the California group, even
though the Conservancy's members have a greater stake
because they actually frequent the Horseshoe Lake State
Park and will feel the diminution in their birdwatching
and other wildlife-viewing activities directly if the
wetlands are destroyed. 3 7
By citing Justice Scalia's Article III-based constitutional
standing decision in Lujan, Judge Posner was probably
deliberately suggesting that his practical standing approach
134. See Ho & Ross, supra note 78, at 600 ("Developments internal to the standing
doctrine of course already offer proof of the fluidity of the doctrine.").
135. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982).
136. See Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 656.
137. Id.
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would reach the same result as constitutional standing
doctrine in many cases, and, therefore, that using his
alternative approach would not radically change the results in
many standing decisions.
3. Finding Standing on the Facts of the Case.
Reversing the district court's decision below finding that the
plaintiffs lacked standing, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
American Bottom Conservancy had standing because "three of
its members who frequent the state park and enjoy watching
birds and other wildlife there" submitted affidavits to the
district court that adequately described how their aesthetic
and recreational enjoyment of the affected area would be
harmed by the permit issued by the Corps."' Judge Posner
explained that the district court judge had misunderstood the
application of standing doctrine to the facts of the case:
The district judge thought that to establish standing
the affiants had to attest that they would be so upset by
the diminution in their bird- and wildlife-watching
activities that they would no longer visit the state park.
That is wrong; it is enough to confer standing that their
pleasure is diminished even if not to the point that they
abandon the site. For that diminution is an injury. 39
He also found adequate causation despite the fact that Waste
Management needed to obtain other permits in addition to the
Corps' wetlands permit, stating:
Although it is not certain that Waste Management will
obtain the required permit from the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency to build the North Milam landfill unless
the Corps of Engineers' permit is voided, it must be likely,
for Waste Management must have spent a great deal of
money designing the landfill.4 0
Finally, Judge Posner concluded that the plaintiffs remedy of
voiding the Corps permit would prevent its injury:
If American Bottom Conservancy can prevent the
wetlands' destruction by knocking out the Corps of
Engineers permit, there will be no North Milam landfill.
And so a judgment in the plaintiffs favor in the present
lawsuit would eliminate a probable injury from the landfill.
No more is necessary to establish standing."
138. Id. at 655, 657, 660.
139. Id. at 657-58 (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 658.
141. Id.
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4. Problems with Judge Posner's Practical Theory of
Standing. Based on his interpretation of the facts in American
Bottom Conservancy, Judge Posner could have found standing
under the standard three-part constitutional Article III standing
test.142 Instead, he sought to do so under an alternative theory
because he apparently believes that a practical standing test is
better than existing constitutional standing doctrine.4 4 He
endorsed a practical standing test that is consistent with his
broader legal pragmatism, which is discussed in Part III.B.
A weakness of Judge Posner's pragmatic approach in his
American Bottom Conservancy opinion was that he was arguably
too dismissive of the Court's constitutional standing precedent.144
A more truly pragmatic approach might be found in Justice
Breyer's attempt in Summers to fashion a realistic approach to
standing from the Court's existing precedent.'" Additionally,
Judge Posner in his American Bottom Conservancy opinion failed
to explain to what extent his practical approach to standing is
similar to or different from the Court's prudential standing
doctrine."' For example, one issue is to what extent his
"practical" approach to standing is similar to or different from his
use of prudential standing doctrine in MainStreet Organization
of Realtors v. Calumet City, which is discussed in Part VI.
B. Judge Posner's Legal Pragmatism
Judge Posner has advocated a "pragmatic" theory of legal
analysis to address a wide range of legal issues.4 1 Judge Posner's
pragmatic philosophy has been discussed and examined at length
by a number of legal scholars."' In general, Judge Posner's
142. Id. at 657-58 (reasoning that American Bottom Conservancy had established
injury, causation, and relief, all of which are necessary for Article III standing).
143. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL
THEORY 227-310 (1999) (arguing that judicial pragmatists should use legal precedent as
valuable "signposts" and sources of information, but not as "limited constraints on [their]
freedom of decision").
144. See supra Part III.A.1 (emphasizing Judge Posner's reliance on secondary
sources, such as law review articles and a casebook, instead of Supreme Court case law).
145. See infra Part V.
146. Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 652-62 (failing to address how practical
standing is different from constitutional standing); see also supra Part II.A.
147. See, e.g., POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 116, at 230-65 (discussing
whether pragmatic adjudication is inescapable); POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL
AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 143, at 243-52 (drawing upon pragmatic reasoning to
address six different example issues, including oil and gas law and homosexual marriage);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 71-123 (1990) (discussing "Legal
Reasoning as Practical Reasoning" and providing examples of practical reasoning in the
law).
148. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 4, at 307-18 (discussing Judge Posner's
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endorsement of a "practical" approach to standing doctrine is
consistent with his overall pragmatic theory of legal
jurisprudence.
According to Judge Posner, from the late 1860s until the
early 1950s, three American philosophers-Charles Sanders
Peirce, William James, and John Dewey-developed a
"pragmatic" approach to philosophical reasoning."' While these
three thinkers differed in some respects, they shared a common
rejection of the traditional philosophical agenda first established
by Plato of "investigating the meaning of.. . truth,... the nature
of reality, the meaning of life, the roles of freedom and causality
in human action, and the nature and ... [meaning] of
morality."' Pragmatists also spurned traditional philosophical
methodological concerns such as conceptualism, the a priori, and
logical reasoning."' Instead, American pragmatists emphasized
empiricism, the use of scientific methodology into all areas of
knowledge and an experimental or instrumental approach to
social problem solving.'
During the 1870s in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a young
lawyer, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., participated in an informal
discussion group with Pierce and James that helped to develop
pragmatism as a school of thought.'"' His subsequent scholarly
work and judicial opinions reflected a pragmatic approach to
legal reasoning.'"' For example, in his 1881 book, The Common
Law, Holmes famously declared in the first sentence: "The life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience.""' In his
subsequent long service as a Justice on the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court and on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice
Holmes rejected legal reasoning based on pure logical deduction
from existing precedents or universal natural laws and instead
argued that judges consider at least to some extent the social and
pragmatic approach to legal reasoning); Peter F. Lake, Posner's Pragmatist
Jurisprudence, 73 NEB. L. REV. 545 (1994) (summarizing and critiquing Judge Posner's
pragmatic theory of legal reasoning); Nancy Levit, Practically Unreasonable: A Critique of
Practical Reason, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 494, 494-518 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)) (same); Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove,
Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687
(2003) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003))
(same).
149. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK, supra note 116, at 231.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 231-32.
154. Id. at 232.
155. Id. (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881)).
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economic consequences of their decisions." In turn, John Dewey,
in a 1924 essay, drew heavily upon Holmes's writings in arguing
against the use of logical deduction in law and instead arguing
for an empiricist approach that examined, in Judge Posner's
description, the "practical consequences of legal decisions."157
In his work on law and economics, Professor Posner drew
upon an empiricist or pragmatic tradition in American law to
show that many judges employ traditional legal vocabulary as a
means to achieve relatively efficient economic ends even if their
opinions did not openly acknowledge economics.' More broadly,
he has criticized legalists who rely upon an arbitrary set of legal
rules and argued in favor of sensible pragmatic judges who
consider a wide variety of legal and nonlegal information as a
means to estimate the long-term impacts of their decisions."'
Judge Posner acknowledges that legal pragmatism has its limits
because "what counts as an acceptably pragmatic resolution of a
dispute is relative to the prevailing norms of particular societies.
Pragmatism provides local rather than universal guidance to
judicial action."'
Judge Posner's terminology for pragmatic legal reasoning
has evolved slightly over the years. In his 1990 book, The
Problems of Jurisprudence, Judge Posner discusses legal
reasoning as "practical reasoning."" He acknowledged that
"[practical reason] lacks a standard meaning."' He defined
practical reasoning as "action-oriented, in contrast to the
methods of 'pure reason' by which we determine whether a
proposition is true or false, an argument valid or invalid."" After
observing that some "neotraditionalist" lawyers used the term
"practical reason" to refer the use of traditional methods in a
particular field, Judge Posner proposed a different definition
based "mainly in Aristotle's discussions of induction, dialectic,
and rhetoric, [that] denotes the methods by which people who are
not credulous form beliefs about matters that cannot be verified
by logical or exact observation."'" His definition arguably
combines the empiricist approach of philosophical pragmatism
with an acknowledgement that lawyers or judges must rely
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 237-38 (citing POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 7).
159. Id. at 238-40.
160, Id. at 241.
161. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 147, at 71-123.
162. Id. at 71.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 71-72.
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sometimes upon their intuition, judgment, and general life
experience to make decisions in the light of incomplete
information.'" His critics point out that relevant empirical data
often does not exist to address a particular legal issue, and, even
when empirical data does exist, it is not always clear how judges
should evaluate the data to reach a decision that depends upon
nonempirical political or moral judgments."' For the purposes of
this Article, it is not necessary to evaluate the overall
effectiveness of Judge Posner's theory of practical reasoning. It is
enough for the purposes of this Article to observe that Judge
Posner's endorsement of practical reasoning as a model for legal
reasoning is generally consistent with his subsequent proposal
for a "practical" approach to standing doctrine in American
Bottom Conservancy.
More recently, Judge Posner has advocated for "legal
pragmatism" more often than using the term "practical
reasoning," but his approach is roughly similar. In his 1999 book,
The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, Judge Posner
suggests that judges and lawyers employ "pragmatic decision
making-the methods of social science and common sense."167 His
proposal that legal professionals use "common sense" is close to
his earlier suggestion that they use "intuition" as part of
practical legal reasoning."' Judge Posner further defines legal
pragmatism "as a disposition to ground policy judgments on facts
and consequences rather than on conceptualisms and
generalities."" In his 2008 book, How Judges Think, Judge
165. Id. at 73, 108-12 (listing intuition as part of practical reasoning and discussing
the role of tacit knowledge and judgment in law).
166. Edwards, supra note 4, at 318-33 (discussing weaknesses of Judge Posner's
empirical pragmatism); Linda E. Fisher, Pragmatism Is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner,
Public Policy, and Empirical Reality, 31 N.M. L. REV. 455, 470-71, 491-92 (2001)
(evaluating how Judge Posner's pragmatism affects his judicial decisions and concluding
that there is a danger when he makes conjectures based on limited evidence or ignores
the normative component of legal rules); Sullivan & Solove, supra note 148, at 691, 694,
703-06, 741 ("We argue that Posner's pragmatism offers little help when it comes to
evaluating and selecting ends, which is critical for resolving legal and policy disputes.");
Steven Walt, Some Problems of Pragmatic Jurisprudence, 70 TEx. L. REV. 317, 327-28
(1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990))
(arguing Posner's theory of practical reasoning "provides no criteria for selecting among
conflicting beliefs induced by different items of practical reason").
167. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 143, at
viii.
168. Compare id. (remarking that judges "can do no better than to rely on notions of
policy, common sense, personal and professional values, and intuition and opinion,
including informed or crystallized public opinion"), with POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 147, at 73, 77 (listing intuition as part of practical reasoning).
169. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 143, at
227.
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Posner explains that "[a] key tenet of legal pragmatism is that no
general analytic procedure distinguishes legal reasoning from
other practical reasoning.""o Thus, he suggests that legal
pragmatism and legal reasoning in general are just one variety of
the broader category of practical reasoning."' In light of Judge
Posner's lengthy work on legal pragmatism and practical
reasoning, it is reasonable to assume that his use of the term
"practical" in defining standing doctrine in American Bottom
Conservancy is roughly consistent with his broader thought on
pragmatism and practical reasoning methodology."' Part IV will
show that Judge Posner's pragmatic or practical reasoning
methodology is quite different from the more legalistic and rule-
oriented approach of Justice Scalia.
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA'S SEPARATION OF POWERS BASED THEORY OF
STANDING
A. Justice Scalia Treats Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers: An Originalist and Rule-Based
Approach to Standing
In 1983, Justice Scalia, then a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, wrote an
article, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, arguing that the "judicial doctrine of
standing is a crucial and inseparable element" of separation of
powers principles required by the structure and original intent of
the Constitution, "which successively describes where the
legislative, executive and judicial powers, respectively, shall
reside."' Judge Scalia criticized U.S. Supreme Court cases from
the late 1960s and early 1970s that liberalized and weakened
standing requirements because, in his view, disregarding
standing doctrine caused "an overijudicialization of the processes
of self-governance."17 ' He concluded that the Court, beginning in
170. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK, supra note 116, at 248.
171. See id.
172. See Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 650 F.3d 652, 656
(7th Cir. 2011). Compare supra Part III.A (identifying the goals of practical standing and
suggesting that judges could alter the doctrine to address problems without being limited
by the Constitution's text and historical practice), with supra Part II.B (identifying
common sense and intuition as being most useful in addressing new problems in light of
incomplete facts, as opposed to using logical or exact observation).
173. Scalia, supra note 13, at 881.
174. Id. at 881-99 (criticizing the liberalized approach to standing in Ass'n for Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970), U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973),
and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)).
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the mid 1970s and continuing through a 1982 decision, had
"returned to earlier [standing] traditions," and, thereby, had
"Return[ed] To The Original Understanding"" of the
Constitution's separation of powers principles."' Justice Scalia's
view that standing doctrine is an essential part of the
Constitution's separation of powers principles is considerably
different from Judge Posner's suggestion that Article III's "Case"
and "Controversy" language does not mandate standing doctrine
and from Judge Posner's call for a practical theory of standing."'
In general, Justice Scalia believes that federal courts should
ascertain the original intent of the framers of the Constitution."'
He has vigorously condemned proponents of a "Living
Constitution," who argue that judges could reinterpret with
changing circumstances, because he believes that approach gives
judges too much authority to ignore the will of the majority as
expressed through Congress and the President."' Unlike Justice
Thomas, who supports a strong version of originalism that gives
less deference to prior opinions of the Court and more weight to
175. This quotation is from the heading for Part V of Judge Scalia's article. Id. at
897.
176. Id. at 897-99 (citing with approval U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974),
Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), and Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982)).
177. Compare supra Part III (discussing Judge Posner's views on standing), with
supra Part IV (discussing Justice Scalia's views on standing).
178. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 44-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
[hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System] (supporting an
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation and criticizing proponents of "The
Living Constitution"); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849, 851-62 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism] (defending originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation but acknowledging some difficulties); see also DAVID A.
SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN
SCALIA 36-41 (1996) (discussing Justice Scalia's originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation). More recently, a "new" originalism method of constitutional
interpretation looks to how ordinary speakers of English would likely have interpreted
the meaning of constitutional terms at the time they were ratified rather than the
subjective "intent" of the drafters. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of
the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 101, 105 (2001); Thomas Colby, The Sacrifice of
the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 716-20, 743-53 (2011). Justice Scalia arguably
adopted a new orginalist approach in his majority opinion in District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and
Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 923, 940 (2009). He has, however, arguably used both the
new public meaning originalism and the old framer intent originalism in his recent
opinions. See Colby, supra, at 771-73 & n.340. Justice Scalia has not yet invoked the "new
originalism" in a standing case.
179. Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 178, at 44-47.
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the views of the framers of the Constitution,' Justice Scalia is a
"fainthearted originalist," who gives some weight to stare decisis,
precedent, as a "pragmatic exception" to his "originalist
philosophy."' Justice Scalia is more pragmatic than Justice
Thomas,'" but Justice Scalia, in his essay The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, expressed his general preference for judges
developing general categorical rules to decide cases rather than
discretionary case-by-case judicial decisionmaking.'" Even as a
self-acknowledged "fainthearted originalist" who pragmatically
considers judicial precedent, Justice Scalia is a more rule-
oriented judge than Judge Posner, who favors a more
discretionary consideration of all circumstances and even
intuition in judicial decisions.'
Judge Scalia, in his standing article, was so skeptical of
judicial discretion in the area of standing that he questioned the
very existence of "the so-called 'prudential limitations of
standing' allegedly imposed by the Court itself, subject to
elimination by the Court or by Congress."'"' He commented:
"Personally, I find this bifurcation [between prudential and
constitutional standing] unsatisfying-not least because it leaves
unexplained the Court's source of authority for simply granting
or denying standing as its prudence might dictate."'" Instead,
Judge Scalia suggested that federal courts should eliminate
prudential standing doctrine and hear all cases for which there is
constitutional standing: "As I would prefer to view the matter,
the Court must always hear the case of a litigant who asserts the
violation of a legal right."' Judge Scalia's criticism of the
existence of prudential standing for allowing a degree of judicial
discretion is sharply at odds with Judge Posner's practical
180. Jeffrey Toobin, Partners, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2011, at 40, 42-43.
181. Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 178, at 140;
Scalia, Originalism, supra note 178, at 864 (professing that he may be a "faint-hearted
originalist"); Toobin, supra note 180, at 42-43.
182. Toobin, supra note 180, at 42-43 (contrasting Justice Thomas's strict
originalism with Justice Scalia's fainthearted originalism).
183. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CI. L. REv. 1175,
1175-88 (1989) (encouraging judges to resist using "totality of the circumstances tests and
balancing modes of analysis").
184. See supra Part III.B (discussing the evolution and current state of the legal
pragmatism theory that Judge Posner advocates).
185. Scalia, supra note 13, at 885.
186. Id.
187. Id. It is possible Justice Scalia today might give more weight to precedent
supporting prudential standing than Judge Scalia did in his 1983 standing article, but, as
the discussion of his 2009 decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute will show, Justice
Scalia still prefers a rule-based approach to standing. See infra Part IV.B-C (discussing
Justice Scalia's originalist and rules-based approach to standing).
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approach to standing based on a judge's discretionary
consideration of factors that is, if anything, arguably broader
than current prudential standing doctrine. 18
B. Justice Scalia's Standing Masterpiece: Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife Makes Separation of Powers the Key to Standing
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Scalia's opinion for
the Court reflected his approach in his 1983 standing article that
standing doctrine is an essential element of the separation of
powers."' His initial discussion in Lujan of separation of powers
principles clearly draws upon of his 1983 standing article.'" In
Lujan, he states:
While the Constitution of the United States divides all
power conferred upon the Federal Government into
"legislative Powers," Art. I, § 1, "[tlhe executive Power," Art.
II, § 1, and "[t]he judicial Power," Art. III, § 1, it does not
attempt to define those terms. To be sure, it limits the
jurisdiction of federal courts to "Cases" and "Controversies,"
but an executive inquiry can bear the name "case" (the
Hoffa case) and a legislative dispute can bear the name
"controversy" (the Smoot-Hawley controversy). Obviously,
then, the Constitution's central mechanism of separation of
powers depends largely upon common understanding of
what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to
executives, and to courts. In The Federalist No. 48, Madison
expressed the view that "[ilt is not infrequently a question
of real nicety in legislative bodies whether the operation of
a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the
legislative sphere," whereas "the executive power [is]
restrained within a narrower compass and ... more simple
in its nature," and "the judiciary [is] described by
landmarks still less uncertain." The Federalist No. 48, p.
256 (Carey and McClellan eds. 1990). One of those
landmarks, setting apart the "Cases" and "Controversies"
that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III-
"serv[ing] to identify those disputes which are appropriately
resolved through the judicial process," Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)-is the doctrine of
standing. Though some of its elements express merely
188. Compare Scalia, supra note 13, at 885-86 (critiquing prudential standing), with
supra Part III.B (discussing Judge Posner's broad-based practical approach to standing).
189. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-578 (1992).
190. Compare id. at 559-60 (discussing standing's important role in the
constitutional separation of the federal government's powers), with Scalia, supra note 13,
at 881-82 (arguing that "standing is a crucial and inseparable element of the [separation
of power] principle" and that disregarding standing leads to "an overjudicilization of the
processes of self-governance" (footnote omitted)).
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prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-
government, the core component of standing is an essential
and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III."'
Justice Scalia's views on standing and the separation of
powers are largely the same in his 1983 article and his Lujan
opinion, with a few concessions to prudential standing precedent
in the latter.'2 In his 1983 article, Judge Scalia acknowledged
that separation of powers principles he relied upon to justify
standing doctrine were "found only in the structure of the
document;" but he argued that those principles were explicitly
addressed by five of the Federalist Papers, including most
notably James Madison's discussion relating to separation of
powers in The Federalist No. 48, the same Paper that Justice
Scalia relied upon in Lujan.193 One difference between his 1983
article and his Lujan opinion is that in the latter document
Justice Scalia does not openly criticize "prudential considerations
that are part of judicial self-government;"" a Justice writing an
opinion for the Court who needs the votes of a majority of the
serving justices cannot be so free to dismiss precedent as a judge
authoring an article. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia, like Judge
Scalia in his 1983 standing article, in Lujan emphasizes that "the
core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part
of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III."'" If
standing is "an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III," there is much less room
for pragmatism and practicality in Justice Scalia's view of
standing than in Judge Posner's approach.9"'
Both Judge Posner and Justice Scalia argue that plaintiffs
must demonstrate some type of personal injury for standing, but
they do so for different reasons. Judge Posner argues that there
191. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60 (alterations in original).
192. Compare Scalia, supra note 13, at 881-86, 890-99 (critiquing the judicial power
to confer prudential standing without reserve), with Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60
(recognizing that prudential-standing considerations exist as "part of judicial self-
government").
193. Compare Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60 (citing The Federalist Paper No. 48 as
support for his interpretation of separation of powers and for his theory of standing), with
Scalia, supra note 13, at 881-82 (asserting that five Federalist Papers, including No. 48,
support his interpretation of the Constitution's separation of powers principle).
194. Compare Scalia, supra note 13, at 885-86 (criticizing prudential standing
doctrine), with Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (noting, and not questioning, prudential standing
doctrine).
195. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
196. Compare supra Part IILA-B (explaining Judge Posner's views on practical
standing and pragmatism), with supra Part IV.A-B (explaining Justice Scalia's view that
standing is part of the original intent of Article III).
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is a practical component to the injury requirement. He argues
that one practical reason for standing doctrine is "to ensure that
the legal remedies of primary victims of wrongful conduct will
not be usurped by persons trivially or not at all harmed by the
wrong complained of."'9 7 Furthermore, Judge Posner, citing
Lujan, explains:
Consistent with the practical as well as doctrinal
thinking behind the requirement of standing, a plaintiff, to
establish Article III standing to sue, must allege, and if the
allegation is contested must present evidence, that the relief
he seeks will if granted avert or mitigate or compensate him
for an injury-though not necessarily a great injury-caused
or likely to be caused by the defendant.198
By contrast, Justice Scalia in his Lujan opinion reasons that
separation of powers concerns require standing doctrine to
include a concrete injury requirement that prevents any
citizen bystander from suing about an alleged impropriety of
government that does not affect him personally and could be
addressed by the political branches instead.' Only plaintiffs
with concrete, personal injuries can utilize the federal courts.20 0
Justice Scalia's concern in Lujan about standing and the
separation of powers is essentially the same as his concern in
his 1983 article about the need for standing to limit the role of
the judiciary and to prevent "an overjudicialization of the
processes of self-governance."20 ' Similarly, in Lujan, Justice
Scalia links the concrete injury requirement to preventing the
judiciary from interfering with the political branches of
government and particularly from interfering with the role of
the President in enforcing the laws. He explains:
Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the
invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury
requirement described in our cases, they would be
discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and
distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch-one of the
essential elements that identifies those "Cases" and
"Controversies" that are the business of the courts rather
197. Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 650 F.3d 652, 656 (7th
Cir. 2011).
198. Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555).
199. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-77.
200. Id.
201. Compare Scalia, supra note 13, at 881-86, 890-99 (expressing concern that not
adhering to Article III standing, as supported by the structure of the Constitution,
violates separation of powers principles), with Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60, 577 (explaining
that permitting standing without a concrete injury would unconstitutionally shift power
from the executive branch to the judicial branch).
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than of the political branches. "The province of the court,"
as Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v.
Madison, ... "is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals." Vindicating the public interest (including the
public interest in Government observance of the
Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the
Chief Executive. The question presented here is whether
the public interest in proper administration of the laws
(specifically, in agencies' observance of a particular,
statutorily prescribed procedure) can be converted into an
individual right by a statute that denominates it as such,
and that permits all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass
of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue.
If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of-
powers significance we have always said, the answer must
be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers'
compliance with the law into an "individual right"
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer
from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most
important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3. It would enable the
courts, with the permission of Congress, "to assume a
position of authority over the governmental acts of another
and co-equal department," Massachusetts v. Mellon,... and
to become "'virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and
soundness of Executive action.'" We have always rejected
that vision of our role ....
Even when Judge Posner and Justice Scalia agree on a
standing issue such as the injury requirement, Judge Posner's
practical concerns focus on the possibility that a plaintiff with no
injury would take an inappropriately large role in a suit
compared to a plaintiff with a greater injury. Judge Posner
explains the injury requirement as follows:
Imagine an environmental group located in California suing
to prevent the Corps of Engineers from granting a permit to
destroy wetlands at the North Milam site even though no
member of the group planned ever to visit the American
Bottom. The suit might be brought before American Bottom
Conservancy brought its own suit and the Conservancy's
suit might be overshadowed by the suit by the California
group, even though the Conservancy's members have a
greater stake because they actually frequent the Horseshoe
Lake State Park and will feel the diminution in their
birdwatching and other wildlife-viewing activities directly if
202. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77 (citations omitted).
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the wetlands are destroyed.203
By contrast, Justice Scalia would be more concerned that
allowing suits by plaintiffs without concrete injuries would lead
to too many suits, allowing Article III federal courts to
impermissibly interfere with the discretion of the Executive
Branch in violation of the President's Article II prerogatives.
Justice Scalia's separation of powers concerns lead him to
demand a more rigid standing doctrine than Judge Posner's more
pliable practical concerns.
C. Summers v. Earth Island Institute: Rejecting Pragmatic
Probabilistic Standing for a Rule-Based Separation of
Powers
Justice Scalia's 2009 decision in Summers v. Earth Island
Institute demonstrates his rejection of a probabilistic and
pragmatic approach to standing in favor of a rule-based
approach.205 Justice Scalia rejected standing for the Sierra Club
and other environmental plaintiffs, even though he
acknowledged that it was "likely" that at least one member would
be injured in the future by the Government's sale of fire-damaged
timber without public notice in some cases, because he demanded
that the plaintiffs meet the traditional rule that they prove when
and where a specific member would be injured.206 By contrast,
Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion in that case, which is
discussed in Part V, articulated a "realistic threat" standing test
that bears some similarity to Judge Posner's practical standing
approach, although Justice Breyer's approach to standing is
arguably more constrained by precedent than Judge Posner's
practical approach to standing.201
In Summers, several environmental groups, including the
Sierra Club, challenged U.S. Forest Service regulations allowing
the Service to sell fire-damaged timber without public notice and
comment if the sale was for less than 250 acres on the ground
203. Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 656.
204. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77.
205. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492-94, 496-500 (2009); see also
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 183, at 1187 (opining that appellate
judges should use the rule of law whenever possible, not totality of the circumstances
tests); supra Part IV.C (discussing Justice Scalia's reasoning for rejecting probabilistic
standing).
206. See Summers, 555 U.S. at 490-91, 499.
207. See id. at 503-510 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Supreme Court
precedent establishes the realistic threat standing test, which should not be "more
stringent than the word 'realistic' implies"); supra Part V (demonstrating how the realistic
threat test found support in precedent and common sense).
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that applicable statutes required public notice and comment.208
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
initially issued a preliminary injunction involving one tract of
land, the Burnt Ridge Project, where one party had undisputed
standing, and the parties settled their dispute over that
Project.209 More controversially, the district court issued a
nationwide injunction against five Forest Service regulations."0
The Ninth Circuit partially affirmed the nationwide injunction
against those regulations applicable to the Project, but
determined that regulations inapplicable to the Project were not
ripe for adjudication.'
In his Summers majority opinion, Justice Scalia reaffirmed
his view in Lujan that federal courts may only appropriately
address suits involving a concrete, personal injury to the plaintiff
because any judicial review outside traditional injury standing
requirements would impermissibly interfere with legislative and
executive prerogatives." He wrote:
In limiting the judicial power to "Cases" and
"Controversies," Article III of the Constitution restricts it to
the traditional role of Anglo-American courts, which is to
redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury
to persons caused by private or official violation of law.
Except when necessary in the execution of that function,
courts have no charter to review and revise legislative and
executive action. This limitation "is founded in concern
about the proper-and goperly limited-role of the courts
in a democratic society.
Justice Scalia concluded that the plaintiffs could not meet
traditional standing requirements for personal injury because
they had shown no actual harm from the challenged regulations,
except for the Burnt Ridge Project case that had already been
settled."' He determined that the standing that the plaintiffs had
to challenge the Project could not serve as the basis for standing
to seek a nationwide injunction against other projects that had
caused no harm yet to any of the plaintiffs' members.215 Justice
Scalia reasoned that the affidavit of Mr. Jim Bensman, a member
of one of the plaintiff organizations, could not establish standing
208. Summers, 555 U.S. at 490-91 (majority opinion).
209. Id. at 491.
210. Id. at 492.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 492-93.
213. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
214. Id. at 494-95.
215. Id. at 491-95.
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based on his assertions that he regularly visited several different
national parks because there was no proof that he was being
harmed by the challenged regulations, but only speculation that
he might be harmed in the future."' Justice Scalia caustically
rejected speculative future harms as the basis of standing:
Here we are asked to assume not only that Bensman will
stumble across a project tract unlawfully subject to the
regulations, but also that the tract is about to be developed
by the Forest Service in a way that harms his recreational
interests, and that he would have commented on the project
but for the regulation. Accepting an intention to visit the
national forests as adequate to confer standing to challenge
any Government action affecting any portion of those
forests would be tantamount to eliminating the
requirement of concrete, particularized injury in fact.
While his rejection of so-called speculative future injuries
is not surprising given his insistence that a plaintiff must
establish a concrete and imminent injury, Justice Scalia's
condemnation of the plaintiffs' theory of probabilistic
organizational standing is revealing because he conceded that
it was likely that at least one of the Sierra Club's 700,000
members would probably be harmed by the Forest Service's
regulations, but he stubbornly insisted that made no difference
unless they could prove a specific injury at a particular time
and place to a named individual.2 "' Justice Scalia rejected
probabilistic standing and Justice Breyer's realistic threat
approach to standing for the following reasons:
The dissent proposes a hitherto unheard-of test for
organizational standing: whether, accepting the
organization's self-description of the activities of its
members, there is a statistical probability that some of
those members are threatened with concrete injury. Since,
for example, the Sierra Club asserts in its pleadings that it
has more than "'700,000 members nationwide, including
thousands of members in California"' who "'use and enjoy
the Sequoia National Forest,"' post, at 502 (opinion of
BREYER, J.), it is probable (according to the dissent) that
some (unidentified) members have planned to visit some
(unidentified) small parcels affected by the Forest Service's
procedures and will suffer (unidentified) concrete harm as a
result. This novel approach to the law of organizational
standing would make a mockery of our prior cases, which
216. Id. at 495-96.
217. Id. at 496.
218. See id. at 496-500.
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have required plaintiff-organizations to make specific
allegations establishing that at least one identified member
had suffered or would suffer harm."'
Justice Scalia's argument that the organizational standing
approach is novel and contrary to precedent is largely true,220 but
he seemed unwilling to consider whether there were practical
advantages to deviating from the strict rules of standing
doctrine. He conceded that it might be "likely" that at least one
member of the plaintiff organizations would be harmed by the
regulations, but argued that was insufficient without more
specific proof of when and where the harm would occur:
While it is certainly possible-perhaps even likely-that one
individual will meet all of these criteria, that speculation does
not suffice. "Standing," we have said, "is not 'an ingenious
academic exercise in the conceivable'. .. [but] requires ... a
factual showing of perceptible harm." Ibid. In part because of
the difficulty of verifying the facts upon which such
probabilistic standing depends, the Court has required
plaintiffs claiming an organizational standing to identify
members who have suffered the requisite harm-surely not a
difficult task here, when so many thousands are alleged to
have been harmed.2 21
Justice Scalia concluded his Summers opinion on standing by
rejecting Justice Breyer's proposed realistic threat test as
inconsistent with the Court's imminent harm test:
The dissent would have us replace the requirement of
"'imminent"' harm, which it acknowledges our cases
establish with the requirement of "'a realistic threat' that
reoccurrence of the challenged activity would cause [the
plaintiffl harm 'in the reasonably near future."' That
language is taken, of course, from an opinion that did not
find standing, so the seeming expansiveness of the test
made not a bit of difference. The problem for the dissent is
that the timely affidavits no more meet that requirement
than they meet the usual formulation. They fail to establish
that the affiants' members will ever visit one of the small
parcels at issue.
In his rejection of Justice Breyer's realistic threat test, Justice
Scalia demonstrated that he takes a strict rules-based approach
to standing.
219. Id. at 497-98.
220. See id. at 498.
221. Id. at 499 (alteration in original).
222. Id. at 499-500 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
223. See id. at 492-93, 497-99 (reviewing precedent and constitutional language as
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V. JUSTICE BREYER'S PRECEDENT-BASED LEGAL PRAGMATISM
AND HIs "REALISTIC THREAT" STANDING TEST IN SUMMERS V.
EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE
A. Justice Breyer's Precedent-Based Legal Pragmatism
In general, Justice Breyer approaches constitutional
interpretation differently from Justice Scalia's originalist and
textualist approaches to judicial interpretation. In his 2008 book,
Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, Justice
Breyer criticizes originalist approaches to constitutional
interpretation, although he recognizes that history and tradition
are factors for a court to consider when interpreting the
Constitution.2  Additionally, he criticizes textualist approaches
to statutory interpretation. Justice Breyer's criticism of
originalism and textualism clearly places him at odds with
Justice Scalia, who favors both approaches to judicial
interpretation.2 26 Justice Breyer has argued that the Constitution
is a living document that must be interpreted differently by
succeeding generations because "[t]oday's Court should not base
an answer to a question about an issue such as gun control on
the facts and circumstances of eighteenth-century society."22 He
does caution, however, that judges must embrace judicial
modesty because their understanding of the world is always
limited and imperfect compared to elected officials who are in
closer contact with the voting public.228
Notably for the purposes of this article, Justice Breyer's 2010
book, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge's View, argues that
rules that disallow the dissent's probabilistic-standing approach).
224. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 12-25, 113-25 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing historical perspectives on the role
of democratic self-government within the Constitution's governmental structure and
criticizing the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation).
225. Id. at 81-97 (criticizing textualists' interpretation of the Constitution). Similar
to Justice Breyer, Judge Posner has criticized Justice Scalia's "textual originalism"
approach to statutory interpretation. Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin
Scalia, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), 12:00 PM),
http://www.tnr.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-
law-textual-originalism.
226. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 18 (2001) (characterizing Justice Scalia as one of the "most consistent judicial
textualists"); supra Part IV.
227. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW 170 (2010).
228. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 224, at 11, 44-45, 62, 69-70 (arguing for
judicial modesty and caution); Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive
Alternative to Textualism and Originalism, 119 HARv. L. REV. 2387, 2388-89, 2397-2403
(2006) (arguing Justice Breyer's Active Liberty book presents a more moderate approach
to constitutional interpretation than the activist "Living Constitution" approach of the
Warren Court during the 1960s).
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judges should usually adopt a pragmatic approach to
constitutional interpretation that considers "a particular
decision . .. as part of a complex system of rules, principles,
canons, institutional practices, and understandings."22 9 Justice
Breyer's approach, judicial pragmatism, appears to give more
weight to precedent than Judge Posner's approach. For example,
Justice Breyer observes that "pragmatism does not require a
court to automatically overrule a decision because it produces
harmful consequences" because a court must consider the
negative effects of overruling precedent on the "law's stability.""'
Furthermore, he writes that "[piragmatic approaches to
law.. . can take account of the interactions of a single decision
with, for example, other decisions, rules, principles, methods,
canons, practices, and the consequential overall effects of
modifying the legal fabric.""' Breyer's approach to pragmatism is
somewhat different from Judge Posner's because Justice Breyer
gives more weight to precedent as illustrated by his dissenting
opinion in Summers.232
In his dissenting opinion in Summers v. Earth Island
Institute, Justice Breyer-joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg-proposed a "realistic threat" standing test when
organizations allege that their members are likely to be harmed
in the future by government action."' Justice Breyer's approach
to standing demonstrated a practical bent similar in some ways
to Judge Posner's practical standing test.234 There are some
differences, however, between Judge Posner and Justice Breyer
on standing and on their general philosophical approaches to law
even though both embrace pragmatism. Justice Breyer sought to
229. BREYER, supra note 227, at 82; see also id. at xiii-xiv, 40, 74-75, 80-87, 154-57,
209-12, 216 (proposing a pragmatic approach to constitutional interpretation).
230. Id. at 83; see also id. at 155-56 (stressing the importance of considering stability
and stare decisis when deciding whether to overrule an earlier case).
231. Id. at 83.
232. Compare supra Part III (describing Judge Posner's legal pragmatism theory and
discussing his dismissal of Article III standing precedent in favor of a practical standing
test), infra Part VI (emphasizing Judge Posner's recognition of, yet disregard for, Article
III standing precedent), and infra Part VII (arguing Judge Posner's practical approach to
standing gives less weight to precedent than Justice Breyer's more realistic approach to
standing), with infra Part V (illustrating Justice Breyer's attention to precedent when he
argued for a "realistic threat" standing test).
233. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 505-10 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
234. Compare supra Part III.A (noting that Judge Posner found standing in the
American Bottom Conservancy case even though harm was merely likely and would not
come to fruition until Waste Management obtained an additional permit), with infra Part
V (noting that Justice Breyer advocated finding standing based on harm very likely to
occur, as the Court found in Massachusetts v. EPA).
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build upon on existing standing precedent and analogies to
common law actions to justify his pragmatic or realistic test for
standing."' Additionally, Justice Breyer did not question the
Court's Article III justification for standing doctrine.236 By
contrast, Judge Posner observed that the Court's Article III
standing framework had been questioned by many scholars and
suggested that the constitutional basis for standing doctrine
237
should be replaced by a practical approach to standing.
B. Justice Breyer's "Realistic Threat" Standing Test in Summers
v. Earth Island Institute
In his dissenting opinion in Summers v. Earth Island
Institute, Justice Breyer argued that the imminence requirement
for injuries used in Justice Scalia's majority opinion and used in
past Court decisions should be understood in light of a "realistic
likelihood" or "'realistic threat"' standard:
How can the majority credibly claim that salvage-
timber sales, and similar projects, are unlikely to harm
the asserted interests of the members of these
environmental groups? The majority apparently does so
in part by arguing that the Forest Service actions are not
"imminent"-a requirement more appropriately
considered in the context of ripeness or the necessity of
injunctive relief. I concede that the Court has sometimes
used the word "imminent" in the context of constitutional
standing. But it has done so primarily to emphasize that
the harm in question-the harm that was not
"imminent"-was merely "conjectural" or "hypothetical"
or otherwise speculative. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Where the Court has directly focused upon the
matter, i.e., where, as here, a plaintiff has already been
subject to the injury it wishes to challenge, the Court has
asked whether there is a realistic likelihood that the
challenged future conduct will, in fact, recur and harm
the plaintiff. That is what the Court said in Los Angeles
v. Lyons, a case involving a plaintiffs attempt to enjoin
police use of chokeholds. The Court wrote that the
plaintiff, who had been subject to the unlawful chokehold
in the past, would have had standing had he shown "a
realistic threat" that reoccurrence of the challenged
activity would cause him harm "in the reasonably near
235. Summers, 555 U.S. at 505-06 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
236. See id. at 503 (disagreeing with the majority opinion about whether a realistic
threat of harm constitutes a concrete injury for Article III standing).
237. See supra Part III.A.
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future." Precedent nowhere suggests that the "realistic
threat" standard contains identification requirements
more stringent than the word "realistic" implies.
Justice Breyer sought to use the Court's Los Angeles v. Lyons
decision as precedent for his realistic threat test,239 although
Justice Scalia pointed out that Lyons had used the test in that
case to deny standing.
Justice Breyer then analogized to different common law
causes of action that are based on future threats to justify a
"realistic threat" test for standing. He wrote:
How could the Court impose a stricter criterion [than
a realistic threat standing test]? Would courts deny
standing to a holder of a future interest in property who
complains that a life tenant's waste of the land will
almost inevitably hurt the value of his interest-though
he will have no personal interest for several years into
the future? Would courts deny standing to a landowner
who complains that a neighbor's upstream dam
constitutes a nuisance-even if the harm to his
downstream property (while bound to occur) will not
occur for several years? Would courts deny standing to an
injured person seeking a protection order from future
realistic (but nongeographically specific) threats of
further attacks?24 '
Justice Breyer argued that the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA
had considered predicted future harms to the coastline of
Massachusetts that computer models estimated would occur
several decades in the future and implied that the forestry
issues in Summers involved more imminent injuries that ought
to be easier to use as the basis for standing. He wrote:
To the contrary, a threat of future harm may be
realistic even where the plaintiff cannot specify precise
times, dates, and GPS coordinates. Thus, we recently
held that Massachusetts has standing to complain of a
procedural failing, namely, the Environmental Protection
Agency's failure properly to determine whether to restrict
carbon dioxide emissions, even though that failing would
238. Summers, 555 U.S. at 505 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
239. Id. (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 & n.7, 108 (1983)) (proposing
the Court adopt the "realistic threat" test used in Lyons).
240. See id. at 495-96 (majority opinion) (stating that, in Lyons, the Court used the
realistic threat test to deny standing); Mank, Summer v. Earth Island Institute Rejects
Probabilistic Standing, supra note 1, at 107-10, 136-37 (discussing Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion in Summers and his use of a "realistic threat" test).
241. Summers, 555 U.S. at 505-06 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. Id.; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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create Massachusetts-based harm which (though likely to
occur) might not occur for several decades.
Justice Breyer contended that the Bensman affidavit contained
sufficient allegations of future harm to satisfy a "realistic threat"
standing test. He wrote:
The Bensman affidavit does not say which particular
sites will be affected by future Forest Service projects, but
the Service itself has conceded that it will conduct
thousands of exempted projects in the future. Why is more
specificity needed to show a "realistic" threat that a project
will impact land Bensman uses? To know, virtually for
certain, that snow will fall in New England this winter is
not to know the name of each particular town where it is
bound to arrive. The law of standing does not require the
latter kind of specificity. How could it?2m
In the above quoted paragraph, Justice Breyer suggested that
Justice Scalia's demands for exactitude in standing allegations
were unreasonable in the light of common sense, such as what we
know about snowfall in New England.
Justice Breyer's realistic threat standing test and his homey
common sense analogies to the common law and snowfall in New
England are closer to Judge Posner's pragmatism and practical
theory of standing than to Justice Scalia's originalism and rule-
based approach to standing doctrine .24  The main difference
between Judge Posner and Justice Breyer is that Judge Posner
questioned the very validity of constitutional standing doctrine,
but Justice Breyer simply sought to read existing constitutional
standing doctrine more broadly within the framework of the
Court's precedent.247 It is impossible to say for certain whether
Judge Posner would have voted with Justice Breyer if they had
sat together for the Summers case, but their approaches to
standing are philosophically more similar to each other than to
Justice Scalia's separation of powers based theory of standing.
243. Summers, 555 U.S. at 506 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 507-08.
245. Compare supra Part III (analyzing Judge Posner's practical standing theory),
and supra Part V (discussing Justice Breyer's precedent-based legal pragmatism and his
"realistic threat" theory of standing in Summers), with supra Part IV (describing Justice
Scalia's separation of powers theory of standing).
246. See supra Part III.A.
247. See supra Part V.
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VI. THE BATTLE BETWEEN JUDGE POSNER AND JUDGE SYKES
ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL VERSUS PRUDENTIAL STANDING IN
MAINSTREET
In only one case has Judge Posner's pragmatic approach to
standing led to a conflict with another judge following a more
traditional Article III approach to standing doctrine. In
MainStreet Organization of Realtors v. Calumet City, Judge
Sykes wrote a concurring opinion criticizing Judge Posner for
using prudential standing doctrine rather than Article III
constitutional standing doctrine to deny standing even though
the result was the same in that case." She may have taken the
time to write a concurring opinion in the case because
conservative judges like Justice Scalia or Judge Sykes commonly
believe that Article III constitutional standing doctrine more
generally limits suits in federal courts compared to the practical
or prudential standing barriers advocated by Judge Posner, even
if the results might be the same in many cases. 249
A. Judge Posner Finds Article III Standing in MainStreet
In MainStreet, an association of real estate brokers
challenged a Calumet City, Illinois "point of sale" ordinance that
forbade the sale of a house without an inspection to determine
whether it is in compliance with the City's building and zoning
codes.250 The Seventh Circuit sitting "en banc" did not reach the
merits of the suit.' Instead, the court of appeals concluded that
neither the real estate brokers as individuals nor their
Association had standing to challenge a law that impedes the
sale of property they sought to broker.
Judge Posner's majority opinion concluded that the plaintiff
met Article III standing requirements, but that prudential
standing doctrine barred the suit.5 He wrote:
A complication is that there are two different concepts
of standing. There is Article III standing, which requires
248. MainStreet Org. of Realtors v. Calumet City, 505 F.3d 742, 749-54 (7th Cir.
2007) (Sykes, J., concurring); see infra Part VI.D.
249. See infra Part VI.D. Compare MainStreet, 505 F.3d at 744-49 (majority opinion)
(arguing plaintiffs met Article III constitutional standing requirements but must be
denied standing on prudential standing grounds), with id. at 749-54 (Sykes, J.,
concurring) (arguing plaintiffs failed to meet Article III constitutional standing
requirements).
250. MainStreet, 505 F.3d at 743-44 (majority opinion).
251. Id. at 744.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 744-49.
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just an injury in fact, and "prudential" standing, a more
complex, judge-made concept of standing. We think there is
standing in the first sense but not the second. There is
standing in the first sense because the brokers may well be
harmed by the ordinance. By adding to the cost of selling
residential property, the ordinance (if allowed to go into
effect) is likely to reduce the brokers' commissions in two
ways. The higher the cost of selling property, the less
property will be sold, and so the fewer commissions the
brokers will be paid. And anything that reduces the
salability of property reduces its market value, and the
lower the price at which a house is sold the smaller the
commission the broker will receive. Of course a seller might
try to charge a higher price in order to cover some of the
cost of complying with the ordinance, and a broker's
commission is normally a percentage of the sale price. But
the seller's attempt would fail if indeed the ordinance
reduces the value of the property to prospective
purchasers.
Judge Posner then addressed counter-arguments that the
ordinance would not harm property values and, accordingly, that
there was insufficient basis for Article III standing. He observed:
Against [my argument that the plaintiff has an injury from
property loss and hence Article III standing] it can be
argued that the ordinance will boost property values in
Calumet City and by doing so perhaps make the brokers
better off rather than worse off. That is possible, but
standing in the Article III sense does not require a certainty
or even a very high probability that the plaintiff is
complaining about a real injury, suffered or threatened. A
suit to redress an injury to the plaintiff is a "case" or
"controversy" within the meaning that the courts have
imprinted on these words of Article III of the Constitution,
Allen v. Wright, as long as there is some nonnegligible,
nontheoretical, probability of harm that the plaintiffs suit if
successful would redress. As we have noted repeatedly, the
fact that a loss or other harm on which a suit is based is
probabilistic rather than certain does not defeat standing.
Thus, as we said in Hoover v. Wagner, in reliance on the
Supreme Court's decision in Pennell v. City of San Jose, "All
that a plaintiff need show to establish standing to sue [in
the Article III sense] is a reasonable probability-not a
certainty-of suffering tangible harm unless he obtains the
relief that he is seeking in the suit." A case is not dismissed
for failure to invoke federal jurisdiction just because the
254. Id. at 744.
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plaintiff fails to prove injury. Ordinarily and here the
allegation is enough.255
Judge Posner's view that a "nonnegligible, nontheoretical
probability of harm" is sufficient injury for Article III standing is
closer to Justice Breyer's subsequent dissenting opinion in
Summers than to Justice Scalia's scathing denunciation of
probabilistic standing in Summers."' Judge Posner did cite
Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan in reasoning that "[t]his is not a
case of some abstract psychic harm or a one-day-I'll-be-hurt
allegation.""' Judge Posner concluded that there was a likely
economic injury to the real estate brokers from delayed sales and
reduced prices sufficient for Article III standing.258
B. Judge Posner Determines that Prudential Standing Bars
Standing in MainStreet
Next, Judge Posner determined that prudential standing
doctrine barred the real estate brokers' suit in MainStreet
because the plaintiffs had suffered only a derivative injury."' He
wrote:
The strand relevant to this case governs the situation in
which the injury on which the plaintiff founds his suit is
derivative from the injury suffered by the defendant's
immediate victim. Often the harm from a harmful act will
ramify far beyond that victim, as the present case
illustrates. The initial victims of an ordinance impeding the
sale of homes are homeowners who would like to sell-or
perhaps all homeowners subject to the ordinance; for as we
said, any impairment of the salability of a property reduces
its value because salability ("alienability" in an older legal
vocabulary) is one of the rights that, along with such other
rights as the right to the exclusive enjoyment of the
property, make a fee-simple interest more valuable than
other interests in property, such as that of a licensee. But
anything that impedes the sale of property, and by
impeding it reduces the number of sales and the average
255. Id. at 744-45 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
256. Compare id. (explaining that a plaintiff need only show a reasonable proability,
as opposed to a certainty, of suffering tangible harm to establish Article III standing),
with supra Part V (discussing Justice Breyer's dissent in Summers, in which he contends
that precedent calls for the imminence requirement for injuries to interpret "realistic
likelihood" as no more than a probability, using a practical approach to explain the
validity of the "realistic threat" test).
257. MainStreet, 505 F.3d at 745 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992)).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 745-49.
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sale price, harms other people besides the owners. It harms
real estate brokers, sure, but it also harms title insurance
companies, mortgage lenders, termite inspectors, moving
companies, interior decorators, renovators, prospective
home buyers, sellers of "for sale" signs, suppliers of paint
for the "for sale" signs, lessors of real estate brokers' offices,
colleges that the children of real estate brokers can no
longer afford to attend because the brokers' incomes have
declined (and the children themselves, of course), and so on
ad infinitum, or at least ad nauseam. If all these incidental
victims could sue, the courts would be overwhelmed.
Moreover, the victims with the largest stakes-namely the
homeowners impeded in selling their homes-who are also
the potential plaintiffs with the first-hand information
about the operation of the ordinance, are likely to be
trampled in the rush to the courthouse. It is not only in
bankruptcy that "clouds of persons indirectly affected by
the acts and entitlements of others may buzz about,
delaying final resolution of cases."
The brokers' suit thus is barred by the principle that,
subject to certain exceptions, one cannot sue in a federal
court to enforce someone else's legal rights.
... [T]he brokers' injury in this case is too remote to sustain
standing even if they might be thought to have a property
right, perhaps in contracts that they have signed with
homeowners who want to sell but because of the ordinance
are less likely to be able to do so at an attractive price.2o
Judge Posner admitted that there was a "wrinkle" in the
case because "the City did not argue remoteness until we raised
the issue at oral argument."2"' While Article III constitutional
standing barriers can be raised sua sponte by a court to dismiss a
case at anytime, even if the parties do not raise the question, it is
less clear whether a court can dismiss a case for prudential
standing reasons if a defendant fails to raise the issue in a timely
manner."' Judge Posner concluded that the Seventh Circuit
could dismiss the suit for the prudential standing issue of
remoteness: "Because what we are calling the doctrine of
remoteness is a method of judicial protection of absent parties or
other unrepresented interests, a court can invoke it on its own
initiative, as many cases make clear.""
260. Id. at 745-47 (citation omitted).
261. Id. at 747.
262. Id. at 747-49.
263. Id. at 748-49.
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C. Comparing American Bottom Conservancy with MainStreet
In American Bottom Conservancy, Judge Posner cited
MainStreet as the only precedent for his practical standing
theory. He wrote: "But the solidest grounds are practical (just
like the avowedly prudential grounds for judge-made
supplements to the Article III standard, MainStreet Organization
of Realtors v. Calumet City, 505 F.3d 742, 744-46 (7th Cir.
2007)).2" In MainStreet, Judge Posner does mention practical
issues involved in standing. For example, he observes that "the
practical objections to allowing the second-tier purchaser to sue
are identical to the objections to allowing someone harmed by the
infringement of another's rights to sue."" In MainStreet,
however, he more frequently discusses standing in light of the
Court's prudential standing doctrine rather than just practical
considerations.26 6
In his American Bottom Conservancy opinion, Judge Posner
never clearly explained to what extent his practical theory of
standing is similar to or different from the Court's prudential
standing doctrine. Perhaps he prefers a practical standing theory
because it gives him more flexibility as a judge to decide standing
than to follow the Court's existing prudential standing doctrine.
If so, Judge Posner should explain more clearly the
considerations he would use in making practical standing
decisions. Possibly, he does not do so because the whole thrust of
his pragmatic approach to judging involves a case-by-case
consideration of numerous factors that are hard to boil down to a
single formula."' Judge Posner's MainStreet decision is in some
ways a stronger opinion than his American Bottom Conservancy
opinion because it is both practical and tries to fit itself within
the Court's precedent.6  Judge Posner's American Bottom
264. Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 650 F.3d 652, 656 (7th
Cir. 2011).
265. MainStreet, 505 F.3d at 747.
266. See id. at 744-49.
267. See id. at 745 (citing several cases, including a Supreme Court case, that
demonstrate the affixed terms of prudential standing, which categorically preclude
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases that otherwise would be allowed
under Article III).
268. See supra Part III.B.
269. Compare supra Part III.A (analyzing Judge Posner's practical standing theory
in American Bottom Conservancy, which rejected Supreme Court precedent, questioned
the validity and efficacy of the tradition, and promoted a pragmatic theory without
attempting to incorporate this theory into current doctrine), with supra Parts VIA-B
(discussing Judge Posner's MainStreet opinion, which did not question or criticize long-
standing precedent, but instead incorporated his practical theory with the prudential
standing doctrine already in place).
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Conservancy opinion may be too radical a break from precedent
to have influence, and Justice Breyer's Summers dissenting
opinion may offer a more realistic option for the Court to
gradually move away from Justice Scalia's Article III approach to
standing.
D. Judge Sykes's Concurring Opinion Argues the MainStreet
Plaintiffs Failed to Establish Article III Standing
In her concurring opinion, Judge Sykes agreed with Judge
Posner's "comprehensive" prudential standing analysis and his
conclusion that the plaintiffs claims were "too remote" for
standing.270 She "disagree[d], however, that the plaintiff has
gotten over the first hurdle of establishing constitutional
standing; Article III's case-or-controversy requirements are not
met here."2 n Judge Sykes reasoned that the fact that the
brokers did not yet have brokers' contracts establishing a
current economic injury barred not just prudential standing,
but also constitutional standing.27 2 She rejected Judge Posner's
reasoning "that the possibility of reduced future
commissions-commissions the brokers have no arguable legal
right or expectation to receive-is enough to confer
constitutional standing.""
Judge Sykes disagreed with Judge Posner's relaxed
approach to meeting the injury requirement for Article III
standing, instead of addressing injury under a prudential
standing analysis.' In light of the plaintiffs' burden to
demonstrate each element of standing, including injury, she
criticized Judge Posner's majority opinion:
[It is hard to understand the court's categorical statement
that a "case is not dismissed for failure to invoke federal
jurisdiction just because the plaintiff fails to prove injury."
Majority op., at 745. To the contrary, it is the plaintiffs
burden to prove injury-in-fact, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62,
112 S. Ct. 2130, and cases are often dismissed for failure of
the plaintiff to carry that burden. Also, I cannot agree with
the court's view that "[o]rdinarily and here the allegation
[of injury] is enough," as long as "there is some
nonnegligable, nontheoretical, probability of harm."
Majority op., at 744. This treats the constitutional
270. MainStreet, 505 F.3d. at 749 (Sykes, J., concurring).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 750-51.
273. Id. at 750.
274. Id. at 752.
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minimums as trifling requirements easily satisfied by
almost any allegation of injury, leaving only prudential
standing considerations to be consulted. But the Supreme
Court has long emphasized that the case-or-controversy
requirement is critical to the legitimacy of the court's role:
"That requirement states a limitation on judicial power, not
merely a factor to be balanced in the weighing of so-called
'prudential' considerations." Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 475, 102 S. Ct. 752, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1982)
("[N]either the counsels of prudence nor the policies implicit
in the 'case or controversy' requirement should be mistaken
for the rigorous Art. III requirements themselves.").275
Judge Sykes reasoned that the plaintiffs did not have a
legally protected interest in possible future broker commissions,
and, therefore, "[wlithout a claim of injury to a legally protected
interest, the brokers cannot establish Article III standing.",7 She
also reasoned that even legally protected interests could not
serve as the basis for Article III standing if the injury depends
upon the actions of independent third parties. She wrote:
Moreover, because the point-of-sale ordinance
regulates real property owners, not brokers, the claim
asserted here arises from the City's allegedly
unconstitutional regulation of someone other than the
Association's members, and "much more is needed" to
establish standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
The attenuated injury asserted by the Association is
insufficient to satisfy this standard. The brokers' alleged
injury (even assuming it is legally cognizable and
judicially redressable) depends upon the independent
action of third parties not before the court-namely, the
property owners upon whom the ordinance operates,
building inspectors and zoning authorities, and
prospective buyers of real property in the City who are
just as likely to pay more, not less, for property that
complies with the City's codes. This is too conjectural to
satisfy the "much more" that is needed to establish
standing where the challenged regulation burdens
someone other than the plaintiff.27 7
In concluding her concurring opinion, Judge Sykes
acknowledged that she had reached the same result as Judge
Posner's prudential standing decision would have reached, but
she argued that it was important to address the Article III
275. Id. (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted).
276. Id. at 753.
277. Id. at 753-54.
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reasons for denying standing to ensure that constitutional
standing principles are "closely monitored and scrupulously
enforced" even where prudential standing doctrine would also
prohibit standing. She observed:
In short, the brokers' alleged injury is "a diffuse and
speculative harm," and more fundamentally, the "interest
asserted is not a legally protected one." The suit therefore
must be dismissed for lack of Article III standing. Of
course, my disagreement with my colleagues on this point
means only that the case is doubly dismissible; I join the
court's conclusion that prudential third-party standing
doctrine bars the Association from bringing this claim.
But if the Supreme Court's recent standing jurisprudence
means anything, it is that constitutional standing
prerequisites are to be closely monitored and
scrupulously enforced. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2562 (2007) ("No principle
is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our
system of government than the constitutional limitation
of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies.") (quotation omitted); DaimlerChrysler,
126 S. Ct. at 1861 ("The case-or-controversy limitation is
crucial in maintaining the tripartite allocation of power
set forth in the Constitution.") (internal quotations
omitted). This is (or should be) true even when there is a
prudential doctrine handy to guard against unwarranted
extensions of judicial authority. I see little reason to
think the Court would be inclined to relax the
constitutional minimums in third-party standing cases.
In MainStreet, Judge Sykes's concurring opinion demonstrated
that she has a strong Article III standing philosophy similar to
Justice Scalia's, and different from Judge Posner's either
pragmatic or prudential approach to standing. Like Justice
Scalia or Judge Scalia in his 1983 article, Judge Sykes argued
for a preeminent role for Article III standing doctrine as a
means to limit the scope of the federal judiciary and thereby
"guard against unwarranted extensions of judicial
authority.""'
VII. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer, and Judge Posner are all
former law school professors,28 0 but Judge Posner acts more
278. Id. at 754 (citations omitted).
279. Id.
280. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court,
127
128 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [50:1
like one today than the others. Both Justice Scalia and Justice
Breyer have authored books and articles since becoming
judges,"' but neither has approached the prolific Judge
Posner's 30 books and more than 300 articles and book
reviews. 8 2 More like an academic than a typical judge, Judge
Posner is more willing to challenge conventional reasoning,
such as Article III as the basis for standing, than other judges,
including either Justice Scalia or Justice Breyer. But being a
maverick may have cost Judge Posner his chance to serve on
the Supreme Court."' It is also possible that Judge Posner is
now more willing to take bold positions, such as abolishing
Article III standing, because he knows that it is unlikely that
he will be considered for the Court, since he celebrated his
72nd birthday in 2011.211
Because presidents have increasingly sought to appoint
judges who reflect their political philosophy,"' it is likely that a
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2012 (stating
Justice Scalia was "a Professor of Law at the University of Virginia from 1967-1971, and
a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago from 1977-1982, and a Visiting Professor
of Law at Georgetown University and Stanford University" and Justice Breyer "was an
Assistant Professor, Professor of Law, and Lecturer at Harvard Law School, 1967-1994, a
Professor at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, 1977-1980, and a
Visiting Professor at the College of Law, Sydney, Australia and at the University of
Rome"); see supra note 115 (establishing Judge Posner as a Senior Lecturer in Law and
listing Judge Posner's courses and seminars).
281. See, e.g., BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 227; ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012);
The Honorable Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Look Back Across
Four Decades, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1635 (2011); Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-
Law System, supra note 178, at 849; Scalia, supra note 13, at 881; Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, supra note 183.
282. Judge Richard A. Posner: Brief Biological Sketch, supra note 3.
283. See Boynton, supra note 10, at 8.
284. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 11 (stating that Judge Posner was
born in 1939).
285. For example, President Reagan, who served in office from 1981 until 1989,
stated that his goal was to appoint a federal judiciary "made up of judges who believe in
law and order and a strict interpretation of the Constitution." O'Brien, supra note 6, at
60-62. Empirical studies have found statistically significant differences in judicial voting
patterns between federal judges appointed respectively by either a Democratic or a
Republican president, although the party of appointment is more significant on average
for some issues than others and not all judges of appointed by a particular party have the
same views. See BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 227, at 154
("Presidents and their judicial appointees are more likely, however, to share a basic
philosophical approach to the country and to the law, and how they relate to each other.");
CROSS, supra note 74, at 22-23 ("[Plresidential ideologies are reflected in the ideologies of
their judicial appointees. The Republican appointees were consistently more conservative,
on average, than the Democratic appointees."); SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 74, at 11-12
passim (analyzing 6,408 published three-judge federal court of appeals decisions during
the 1995-2004 period and finding statistical significant differences in judicial voting
between Democratic and Republican appointees in several subject areas, but not in other
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Republican president contemplating a Supreme Court
appointment would prefer a judge favoring a consistent Article
III standing barrier to "unwarranted extensions of judicial
authority"28 6 to a pragmatic judge who might take positions
contrary to the President's ideological views in some cases.287 The
last two presidents, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, each
appointed two justices to the Court and each of these two justices
agreed with the other justice appointed by the same president
between ninety-four to ninety-six percent of the time during the
Court's 2010-2011 term."' Perhaps because they feared that
subject areas, including standing questions). Professor Cross cautions, however, that not
all Republican or Democratic presidents have the same views as other presidents of the
same party and that judges do not perfectly replicate the ideologies of the presidents who
appoint them or the senators who confirm them. CROSS, supra note 74, at 7-8. Compare
id. at 185-86 (finding tentative empirical evidence that Republican judges are more likely
to deny standing than Democratic judges), and Pierce, supra, note 75, at 1742, 1760
(same), with SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra, at 53-54 (finding no statistically significant
differences between Republican and Democratic appointees serving on the D.C. Circuit on
standing issues).
286. MainStreet Org. of Realtors v. Calumet City, 505 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Sykes, J., concurring); see also SUNSTEIN ET AL, supra note 74, at 53 (observing that
conservative Supreme Court justices seem more likely to find find that parties lack
standing and that "conservative judges are more likely to be appointed by Republican
presidents").
287. Some justices in the past broke with the views of their appointing president, but
presidents have increasingly sought to avoid such "mistakes." Justice Stevens was
appointed by Republican President Ford and Justice Souter by Republican President
George H.W. Bush, but both voted more closely with more liberal Democratic appointees
to the disappointment of the Republican Party. Robert Barnes, With Justice Sotomayor, a
First Year that Stands Apart, WASH. POST, July 11, 2010, at Al (reporting John Oldham
McGinnis, a law professor at Northwestern University, characterized Justice Souter as
voting with the conservative wing of the Court during his first year, but thereafter
became a reliable liberal vote); Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens: What Will the Supreme
Court Be Without Its Liberal Leader?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 2010, at 38, 39, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/03/22/100322fafact toobin (identifying Justice
Stevens as the leading liberal justice for many years despite being appointed by a
Republican president).
288, The two justices that Democratic President Obama nominated to serve on the
Supreme Court, Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, "agreed ninety-four percent of the
time (during the 2010-2011] term, according to statisticians at SCOTUSblog.com." Robert
Barnes, Justices Who Will Shape Court Future Pair Up, WASH. POST, June 29, 2011, at A6,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/justices-who-will-shape-supreme-courts-
future-are-matching-pairs/2011/06/28/AGOaNopHistory.html?wpisrc=nlheadlines; Stat
Pack for October Term 2010: Justice Agreement - All Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG 19 (June 28, 2011), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
201106/SBOT10 -stat pack final.pdf. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan also voted
consistently with Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, who were
appointed by Democratic President Clinton, between eighty-five percent and ninety-one
percent of all the cases during that term. Id. Republican President George W. Bush's two
nominees to the Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.,
agreed in ninety-six percent of the Court's decisions, and each agreed with the other
Republican appointees, Justices Scalia and Thomas in eighty-six to ninety percent of the
cases. Id.
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Judge Posner's pragmatism might lead him to disagree with
other justices appointed by Republican presidents, neither
Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, nor George W. Bush
nominated Judge Posner to the Court despite his acknowledged
brilliance as a judge and legal scholar.289
Judge Posner makes powerful arguments for a pragmatic
approach to standing. But there are two major objections. First, a
serious weakness of Judge Posner's pragmatic approach in his
American Bottom Conservancy opinion was that he was arguably
too dismissive of the Court's constitutional standing precedent.
Despite the arguments of many academics that Article III does not
mandate a standing requirement in federal courts, Judge Posner's
suggestion that courts eliminate constitutional standing doctrine is
contrary to precedent dating to 1944. It is unlikely that the Court
will abolish constitutional standing doctrine even if not all judges
defend it as strongly as Justice Scalia. Justice Breyer's proposal in
Summers to adopt a more realistic approach to current
constitutional standing doctrine is more politically astute than
Judge Posner's suggestion to abolish the doctrine.
Second, a pragmatic approach to standing inevitably allows
judges to make ad hoc decisions, and even ones based on "intuition,"
according to Judge Posner's legal pragmatism. Critics have charged
that prudential standing doctrine gives judges broad discretion. In
Newdow, Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion criticized the
majority opinion for its ad hoc approach. Judge Posner's practical
standing theory is even more vulnerable than prudential standing
doctrine to the charge that it lacks general philosophical principles
needed for a consistent body of law. Judge Posner, in his American
Bottom Conservancy opinion, failed to explain to what extent his
practical approach to standing is similar to or different from the
Court's prudential standing doctrine. For example, to what extent is
his "practical" approach to standing similar to or different from his
use of prudential standing doctrine in MainStreet? If he wants other
judges to adopt his practical approach to standing doctrine, Judge
Posner, in future cases, will have to explain how a practical
standing doctrine would work in a variety of cases. Even for a judge
as brilliant as Judge Posner, changing standing doctrine from its
Article III rationale will not be easy. Justice Breyer's efforts to
liberalize existing Article III standing precedent and doctrine
through a "realistic threat" test based upon precedent may prove
more fruitful than Judge Posner's approach of abolishing
constitutional standing and replacing it with his proposed
alternative "practical" standing test.
289. See Boynton, supra note 10.
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